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Executive Summary
C opyright – our system for protectingand encouraging creativity – has
been described as “the engine of free
expression.”1 But copyright can also inter-
fere with free speech – with the public’s
right to share, enjoy, criticize, parody, and
build on the works of others. Resolving
these sometimes conflicting claims re-
quires policymakers, in the words of the
Supreme Court, to strike a “difficult
balance” between rewarding creativity
through the copyright system and
“society’s competing interest in the free
flow of ideas, information, and com-
merce.”2
     A critical component of this “difficult
balance” is the system of free-expression
“safety valves” within copyright law. Four
of these safety valves – the “idea/expres-
sion dichotomy,” the concept of fair use,
the so-called first-sale rule, and the public
domain – provide necessary breathing
space for free trade in information and
ideas. The free-expression safety valves
keep the system in balance and prevent
the monopoly control created by copyright
law from becoming rigid and repressive.
     But the “difficult balance” has become
lopsided in recent years. With the advent
of electronic communications, and in
particular the Internet, the media compa-
nies that make up the “copyright industry”
have adopted techniques of “digital rights
management,” which control the accessing
and use of creative materials in ways that
are often inconsistent with a free and
democratic copyright system. Two federal
laws, both passed in 1998, have further
distorted the system by favoring the
industry at the expense of the public’s
interest in accessing, sharing, and trans-
forming imaginative works.
     One of these laws, the “Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act,” extended
the term of copyright protection to nearly a
century for corporations and even longer
for many individuals and their heirs. It
consequently delayed the time when
cultural products will enter the public
domain and be freely available. The other
law, the “Digital Millennium Copyright Act”
(DMCA) made it a crime to distribute
technology that circumvents the industry’s
electronic locks on books, films, articles,
software, or songs – even though circum-
vention itself is not always illegal, and even
though a ban on technology strikes directly
at scientific research.
     Meanwhile, battles over online “file
sharing” of music, movies, books, and
software have created a crisis in the
entertainment industry, alienated many
fans, and failed to resolve the question of
how much sharing should be allowed or
whether all of it should be stringently
prosecuted as a violation of copyright law.
     The courts have not always been equal
to the task of resolving these copyright
conflicts. A constitutional challenge to the
Sonny Bono law was rejected by the
Supreme Court in 2003. The Court’s
decision ignored the law’s adverse effects
on culture, and seemed to suggest that
Congress, by continually extending the term
of copyright, can freeze the public domain
indefinitely.  But in the process of fighting
this well-publicized case, many defenders
of the public interest – archivists, libraries,
and scholars among them – began to
organize and advocate for changes in the
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copyright system that could help bring
valuable if long-forgotten works into the
public domain.
     There have already been many lawsuits
involving the DMCA. In one early case, the
federal government criminally prosecuted a
company that created a device to decrypt
electronic books. Although a judge rejected
the company’s defense – that its circum-
vention device had legitimate (indeed,
constitutionally protected) uses that would
not infringe the copyrights on e-books – a
jury eventually acquitted the company. But
in another case, online journalists who
distributed “DeCSS,” a program for
decrypting DVDs, were found to have
violated the DMCA even though the
program could be used in ways that would
not infringe copyright. The courts even
ordered the defendants to remove links on
their Web site to other sites that contained
the DeCSS code.
     To fight online file-sharing, the music
industry went to court to shut down
Napster. New, less centralized systems like
Grokster and KaZaA, however, quickly
replaced Napster, and the industry has not
so far persuaded the courts that these
digital copying and sharing technologies
are themselves “contributory” infringers of
copyright. But the war against file-sharing
has only intensified. In late 2003, the
industry sued more than 200 individuals,
including teenagers, for sharing music
online.
     Public interest groups, scholars, librar-
ians, artists, computer scientists, and others
in the growing “copyleft” movement are
responding to the copyright crisis with
projects that encourage the sharing of
information and creative works. Some
promote and distribute free software.
Others are advocating for a more flexible
system that would allow material lacking in
current commercial value to enter the
public domain sooner.
     Conflicts between “strong” copyright
control and free expression today thus
occupy center stage in the public policy
arena. The diversity and vitality of our
culture depends on resolving these con-
flicts in a way that maximizes artistic and
intellectual freedom.
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Introduction:
The “Difficult Balance” Between Copyright
and Free Expression
hen we think of creativity and free
expression, it is the First Amend-
ment that usually comes to mind. But there
is another section of the Constitution
whose explicit purpose is “to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.” This
is the Copyright Clause, and it authorizes
Congress to grant “for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”3  The theory is that creative
people need the promise of financial
reward to motivate them to produce art,
music, literature, scholarship, and scientific
innovation.
     Copyright owners these days, of
course, are not necessarily impecunious
writers, artists, or philosophers chewing at
their tattered overcoats. Corporations own
many copyrights, and trade groups are
aggressive in asserting the “exclusive
right” to control and profit by copyrighted
works.
     In the 1970s, for example, the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) tried to stop grocery
stores from playing radios unless they paid
fees for the songs that were aired. Twenty
years later, ASCAP demanded fees from
summer camps for songs the children sang
around their campfires. The Walt Disney
Company threatened daycare centers that
had likenesses of Mickey Mouse painted
on their walls.4  From attempts to stop the
technology of “piano rolls” in 1908 to the
1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
restricting access to copyrighted works
today, media companies have pushed for
stronger controls.
     It is a mistake, however, to think that the
monopoly control bestowed by copyright is
absolute. From the beginning, copyright law
was intended to balance the rights of
owners against those of the public – to give
just enough incentive to enhance creativity.
When the English Parliament passed the
first modern copyright law, the Statute of
Anne, in 1710, it did so in part to stop
publishing monopolies “from oppressing
authors, potential competitors, and the
public.”5 The first American copyright law,
in 1790, covered only books, maps, and
charts, and granted monopoly control for a
mere 14 years (renewable for another 14).6
The Copyright Clause itself specifies only
“limited times” for monopoly control of
creative works, after which they enter the
public domain – that is, they become freely
available for anyone to publish, sell, copy, or
preserve.
     Even during the “limited time” of
copyright protection, the “exclusive right” is
not perfect or absolute.7 Not every copying
of copyrighted material, nor every song
sung at a beach party or birthday bash, is
unlawful unless the copyright owner is
found and gives permission. In part, this
flexibility simply reflects a recognition of
practical realities. But it is also a vital
element of the “difficult balance” between
open accesss and copyright control. Free-
expression safety valves within the copy-
right system, such as allowing the public to
make “fair use” of copyrighted works, thus
provide essential lubrication for copyright’s
“engine of free expression.”
     Aggressive assertions of copyright
control over the last quarter century have
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often ignored this necessary play in the
joints. In the early 1980s, for example,
entertainment companies sued the Sony
Corporation to stop distribution of the
Betamax, an early version of the VCR,
because it could be used to make unautho-
rized copies of TV shows. The suit was
particularly shortsighted, given that rental
and sale of films on video would soon
become extremely lucrative for the indus-
try. But in any event, the Supreme Court
rejected the suit, ruling that a technology
cannot be banned just because it might be
used for nefarious ends, if it is also “ca-
pable of commercially significant non-
infringing uses.”
     Home recording of TV programs for
purposes of time-shifting was such a “non-
infringing use,” said the Court. Even though
it involves copying entire programs, time-
shifting qualifies as “fair use” under
copyright law. Indeed, the Court noted that
among those who favored time-shifting
was Fred Rogers of Mr. Rogers’ Neigh-
borhood, who testified at the Sony trial
that “he had absolutely no objection to
home taping for noncommercial use,” and
that “it is a real service to families to be
able to record children’s programs and to
show them at appropriate times.”8
     Major corporations have continued to
push for restrictions, however. In recent
years, the company that owns the Priceline
Web site has claimed that its method of
selling airline tickets is protected by patent
law – a close relative of copyright – and
may not be copied. Netflix.com obtained a
patent on the way that its Web site rents
DVD movies. And IBM “patented a
method for keeping track of people waiting
in line for the bathroom.”9
     These zealous assertions of ownership
are driven in part by the concept of intel-
lectual property (“IP”) to describe copy-
rights, trademarks, patents, and “trade
secrets.” Viewing creative works as
property, however, leads to the presumption
that they can and should be owned and
controlled forever. But as we have seen,
this is not what the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution envisions, nor is it consistent
with a free society.
     As the scholar and activist Lawrence
Lessig writes, products of imagination and
intellect are “nonrivalrous” – that is, they
are inexhaustible. A book can be read, read
again, and given away for others to read.
Its value is not used up. Unlike “rivalrous”
resources, works of the imagination do not
need a system of control to assure that
they are not depleted; they only need a
system that encourages their creation, and
fairly rewards their creators.10
     Another leading thinker, Siva Vaid-
hyanathan, puts “intellectual property talk”
at the root of today’s conflicts over anti-
circumvention technology, extensions of the
“limited time” of copyright, and other
efforts by the industry to expand its control.
Vaidhyanathan notes that the term “intel-
lectual property” is
“fairly young,”
having originated
with the UN’s
World Intellectual
Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) in
1967. Soon after-
ward, major
American organiza-
tions that concern
themselves with
copyright, patent,
and trademark law “changed their names
to incorporate ‘intellectual property.’”
Thus, “over the past thirty years, the
phrase ‘intellectual property’ has entered
The Walt Disney
Company
 threatened
daycare centers
that had like-
nesses of Mickey
Mouse painted on
their walls.
6      “The Progress of Science and Useful Arts”
common usage with some dangerous
consequences.” For copyright
     This does not mean, of course, that
authors should receive no compensation or
that media companies should not profit
from their
investments.
Few critics of
the current
situation want
to eliminate
copyright
protection. But
xeroxing a
poem or
dubbing a tape for a friend has not usually
been considered a law-enforcement
problem. Internet downloading and file-
sharing are, conceptually at least, the
contemporary equivalents. That is, any
transmission of information online techni-
cally involves copying – even simply
visiting a Web site, which requires repro-
duction of the site on your computer
screen. Not every such reproduction should
be considered a violation of copyright law.
     Understandably, copyright owners are
concerned when cultural sharing is multi-
plied from a few friends to millions around
the globe. But the industry tends to lump
together all copying under the nefarious
heading of “piracy,” when in fact there are
substantial differences between large-
scale, for-profit enterprises that sell unau-
thorized copies of music, software, or
movies, and, for example, students’ or
scholars’ sharing of favorite songs or news
articles through a university network. In
between are difficult questions about wide-
spread, not-for-profit music and movie-
sharing. Although copying on this level is
generally assumed to be unlawful, it is not
clear that the remedy is to make criminals
of millions of Americans.
     If modern technology has made copying
vastly simpler, and achievable on a world-
wide scale that was never possible before,
it has also enabled media companies to
exercise unprecedented control over the
use of their products through systems of
digital rights management, or “DRM.”
DRM controls that are built into cultural
materials frequently undermine the free-
expression safety valves that are so
fundamental a part of the copyright system.
Electronic locks and other DRM technolo-
gies now inhibit fair-use copying for
purposes of study, criticism, or parody, the
ability to share a book or CD with a friend,
and even the availability of works that are
already in the public domain.12
     As a result of DRM, some CDs now
come with locks to prevent them from
being played or copied on computers.13
“Clickwrap” agreements – those online
scrolls of legalese to which one must click
“yes” in order to reach the desired content
– have become increasingly oppressive,
and inconsistent with the flexibility of
copyright law. Some Web sites include
lengthy agreements that flatly require
viewers to relinquish their fair-use rights as
a condition of accessing the site.14 As many
observers have warned, we seem to be
moving toward a “pay per view” society
where the information, inspiration, and
ideas contained in creative works of all
kinds are becoming increasingly expensive
and difficult to obtain – just at the time,
ironically, that the Internet offers the
Mr. Rogers
testified that “he
had absolutely no
objection to home
taping for non-
commercial use.”
was not meant to be a “property
right”as the public generally
understands property. It was
originally a narrow federal
policy that granted a limited
trade monopoly in exchange for
universal use and access.11
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promise of unprecedented global linkage
and communication.
     The tension continues to grow between
strong copyright control and the values of
free expression and access to information.
Yet much of the debate is carried on
among a relatively small priesthood of
lawyers, advocates, and policymakers who
communicate in a largely unknown lan-
guage. This report is intended to bridge the
gap by describing the challenges to art,
scholarship, and free expression that are
posed by copyright law in the digital age. It
explains the major issues and court cases in
understandable terms. Obviously, it cannot
cover all the details of “intellectual prop-
erty” law and policy. We hope, though, that
it will provide a useful guide to the issues
and a sense of why they matter for artists,
scholars, and all who care about free
expression and access to ideas.
Tom Forsythe, “Food Chain Barbie”
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Chapter 1:
Four Free-Expression “Safety Valves”
The  “ Idea /Express ion
D icho tomy”
Fa i r  U s e
     The first free-expression safety valve in
the copyright system is the idea/expression
dichotomy. Copyright law protects the
specific language, structure, images, or
details of plot and character in a creative
work (that is, their “expression”), but it
does not protect facts or ideas. As the
Supreme Court explained in a recent case
that involved the reproduction of informa-
tion in a telephone directory, copyright
“rewards originality, not effort.” Thus,
collecting and publishing facts (in that case,
names, addresses, and telephone numbers)
does not possess even “the minimal
creative spark required by the Copyright
Act and the Constitution.”15
     As for ideas, the law recognizes that
authors and artists copy them all the time.
The idea of star-crossed lovers whose
families object, and whose passion comes
to a tragic end, would not be copyrightable
even if Shakespeare had written his
version of the story in 1994 instead of
1594. Of course, Shakespeare took the plot
of not only Romeo and Juliet but most of
his other masterpieces from existing
sources. The idea/expression dichotomy
allows artists and writers to draw freely on
the themes, myths, and images that fill our
culture.
     Of course, drawing the line between
protected “expression” and unprotected
facts or ideas is not always easy. Even
without word-for-word copying or direct
paraphrasing, a work that bears “substan-
tial similarity” to an earlier creation will
usually be considered a “derivative work,”
and therefore an infringement of copyright.
How to distinguish between the legitimate
borrowing of ideas and the illegal creation
of a “derivative work” can be a tricky
business.
     For example, in one case, a federal
court found that software designed to help
dentists organize their offices violated the
law even though it did not copy anybody
else’s computer code, because its “struc-
ture, sequence, and organization” were
“substantially similar” to an earlier soft-
ware program. The nation’s leading treatise
on copyright said that the court’s rationale
in this case was wrongheaded, because
“providing protection for such amorphous
concepts as the ‘overall structure’” of a
software program undermines the idea/
expression dichotomy.16
     But these same authors also thought
that Stephen Sondheim and Leonard
Bernstein’s borrowing of plot elements
from Romeo and Juliet for their classic
Broadway musical, West Side Story, would
have violated Shakespeare’s copyright, had
he owned one. They admitted that not all
courts would find the details of West Side
Story to be “a sufficiently concrete expres-
sion of an idea so as to warrant a finding of
substantial similarity.”17 But this example
illustrates how shifting and unpredictable
the idea/expression dichotomy can be.
     Fair use is probably the best-known of
the free-expression safety valves. It allows
anyone to copy, quote, and publish parts of
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a copyrighted work for purposes of com-
mentary, criticism, news reports, scholar-
ship, caricature, or even, as we have seen,
recording and time-shifting of television
programs. Not only does fair use allow
culture to thrive; it also prevents publishers
and authors from suppressing criticism and
parody of their works.
      So, when the rap group Two Live
Crew borrowed the melody and parodied
the words of Roy Orbison’s pop song, “Oh!
Pretty Woman,” in a vulgar style that the
copyright holder did not appreciate, the
Supreme Court indicated that it was
probably fair use. Even though intended for
commercial sale, Two Live Crew’s raun-
chy version, with lines such as “big hairy
woman” and “two-timin’ woman,” served
the important cultural purpose of mocking
the “white bread” original. And to be
effective, said the Court, parodists must
quote enough of the copyrighted work to
conjure it up in listeners’ minds.18
     The Nation magazine had a less
fortunate experience in the 1980s after it
quoted about 300 words from ex-President
Gerald Ford’s about-to-be-published
memoir without permission. The Nation’s
quote was part of a 2,200-word news
scoop highlighting Ford’s description of his
pardon of Richard Nixon (Ford’s predeces-
sor in the White House), for possible
crimes during Nixon’s presidency. In
reaction to The Nation’s scoop, Time
magazine canceled its “first serial rights” to
publish highlights from Ford’s book.
     The Supreme Court, identifying with the
publisher’s plight in losing this income from
first serial rights, rejected The Nation’s
claim of fair use. But three justices dis-
sented, arguing that the scoop served the
public interest, and accusing the Court
majority of a “constricted reading of the
fair use doctrine” that ill-served the pro-
gress of arts and sciences and the robust
public debate essential to an enlightened
citizenry.”19
     More recently, the writer Alice Randall
faced a fair-use battle when she borrowed
characters and plot from Margaret
Mitchell’s classic Gone With the Wind to
produce The Wind Done Gone, a fictional-
ized critique of the earlier novel’s racist
stereotypes. The Wind Done Gone
mentions homosexuality and interracial sex,
both of which the Mitchell estate prohibits
in its policy for licensing “derivative
works.” A trial judge was persuaded to ban
the novel as an unauthorized sequel. A
federal appeals court reversed, finding The
Wind Done Gone to be a parody, and
hence, fair use.20
     As these examples suggest, fair use is
close to the heart of free expression. If
copyright owners could control – and
effectively ban – every quotation or other
use of their work, they would exercise a
powerful form of censorship. An example
of this phenomenon involved the Church of
Scientology, which holds the copyright to
religious texts including New Era
Dianetics for Operating Thetans, or
“NOTs.” A critic of the Church posted the
NOTs online without permission, to demon-
strate what he believed was their criminal
nature, but a federal appeals court rejected
his claim of fair use.21
     In a later case also involving religion,
the Worldwide Church of God was able to
suppress a breakaway sect’s use of
prophetic texts by Herbert Armstrong, the
Church’s founder. The Church elders no
longer wanted the texts in circulation on
account of “ecclesiastical errors.” The
breakaway group was thus unable to
distribute what it believed were important
religious works. A federal court of appeals
upheld the copyright claim, over the dissent
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of one judge who did not think that copy-
right law should be used to suppress
religious works, and who felt that the
splinter group’s noncommercial and spiri-
tual motivation entitled it to a finding of fair
use.22
     So essential is the fair use concept to
free expres-
sion that it
has also made
its way into
trademark
law. In a case
involving a
rock song that
made fun of
the Mattel
Company’s
fabulously
successful
Barbie Doll, a
federal court of appeals ruled that the song
was a constitutionally protected parody.
The judges said that even if some consum-
ers might be confused and think the song
was sponsored by Mattel (likelihood of
confusion being the basis of trademark
infringement), the free-expression right of
the rock group to parody Barbie took
precedence.23
     On the other hand, the enthusiasm of
movie, book, and music fans is often
squelched by unappreciative copyright
owners. Internet “fan sites” have shut
down after media corporations threatened
their proprietors with suits for trademark
and copyright infringement. The rock band
Phish claims control over all fan sites and
forbids them from containing “defamatory”
or “offensive” content. Twentieth Century
Fox sent cease-and-desist letters to Buffy
the Vampire Slayer fan sites, driving, as
one reporter quipped, “a stake into the
hearts of Netizens everywhere.” And
Warner Brothers has suppressed sites
containing irreverent sexual parodies of
such Looney Tunes favorites as Bugs
Bunny, Daffy Duck, and Tweety, claiming
that these “beloved characters” should not
be maligned by lascivious humor.24
     Corporations also try to suppress online
“cybergriping” by acquiring Internet
domain names that contain the suffix
“sucks” – commonly used to signal a site
critical of corporate activities or products.
The World Intellectual Property
Organization’s online arbitration board has
allowed some sites to continue – for
example, “wallmartcanadasucks.com” –
but has transferred the domain names of
others, such as “guinness-beer-really-
sucks.com,” to the complaining corporation,
which can then make sure that the name is
never again used for a site offering parody
or criticism of its practices.25
     In one leading case involving the
“sucks.com” phenomenon, a judge ruled
that a reasonable consumer or Web surfer
interested in the Bally chain of fitness clubs
would not be confused by a “Bally sucks”
Web site, and that allowing Bally to shut
down the site would unacceptably allow
trademark law “to eclipse First Amendment
rights.”26 But most of these disputes never
make it to court, and threats of litigation are
often enough to suppress criticism of
corporate practices and products.
     Similarly, wealthy organizations ranging
from the Walt Disney Company to the
National Basketball Association often use
“cease-and-desist” letters to intimidate
critics and chill “appropriationist art.”27 The
rap music technique of sampling has been
inhibited by lawsuits that challenge the
borrowing of even a few bars of a lyric or
melody for purposes of incorporating them
into a new musical creation.28
Two Live Crew’s
parody of “Oh!
Pretty Woman”
served the
important cultural
purpose of
mocking the
“white bread”
original.
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The First Sale Rule
     Indeed, the fact that an injunction was
entered halting publication of The Wind
Done Gone – even though it was eventu-
ally reversed on appeal – demonstrates
how subjective and unpredictable fair use
can be. The four factors that enter into a
finding of fair use, as enumerated in the
copyright law, all involve judgment calls.29
As one scientist has written, the legal
definition of fair use is “maddeningly
vague. ... Even a well-trained copyright
lawyer cannot say with certainty where the
line lies between fair and unfair uses.”30
     A third critical safety valve is the first
sale rule – the concept that copyright
holders only control the first sale of their
works, after which purchasers may give
them away, sell them, or otherwise pass
them along to friends, colleagues, second-
hand stores, libraries, schools, Salvation
Army outlets, flea markets, auctions, or any
other place where the public can re-use
them. Video stores can rent tapes to
countless customers, and libraries can
likewise lend books to countless borrowers
– who in turn can lend them to their
friends, as long as someone returns them
on time.31
     The first sale rule aids immensely in the
spread of knowledge, entertainment,
inspiration, and ideas. It is also a pragmatic
recognition of the limits of copyright
enforcement. For few of us would want to
live in a world where corporations or
government agents monitor and control
what we do with every book, computer
program, or CD that we buy. Yet through
encryption, mandatory clickwrap agree-
ments, and other “DRM” techniques, the
copyright industry has been able to under-
mine the rights of the public under the first
sale rule.
     Compared to fair use, there have been
relatively few legal disputes involving the
first sale rule. Still, there are some close
and difficult questions. In one case, a court
ruled that tearing illustrations from a
legitimately purchased book and mounting
them on ceramic tiles for resale was not
protected by the first sale rule. But in a
later case, a different court found that
mounting lawfully acquired cards on tiles
was protected.32 More recently, software
companies have been able to circumvent
the first sale rule by “licensing” rather than
selling their products.33
     The copyright industry has persuaded
Congress to enact two major exceptions to
the first sale rule – one for music and the
other for computer software. Although a
purchaser of a CD can still give or sell it to
a friend, anyone with a “commercial
purpose” is forbidden, under the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984, from renting
or lending musical recordings.34 The
industry feared that without this exception,
music lovers would rent their favorite
recordings and then copy them onto tape
for their home collections, instead of buying
them. Libraries and other nonprofit educa-
tional institutions have an exemption from
the law, and are still permitted to lend
musical works.
     In 1980, the industry carved out another
exception to the first sale rule for software.
The justification, according to the U.S.
Copyright Office, was that computer
programs are “the only type of copyrighted
work that can be easily, quickly, totally, and
perfectly copied by an infringer.”35 Again,
nonprofits are exempted.
     The authors of the leading treatise on
copyright law criticize this erosion of the
first sale rule. They argue that a book
buyer should have the same right to
distribute the book to others regardless of
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The All-Important Public
Domain
whether it is in “hardcopy” or electronic
form.36 Likewise, it is questionable
whether the computer software industry
should, through licensing and other con-
tracts, be able to undermine the fundamen-
tal principle that after the first sale of a
work, copyright owners have no further
right to control its distribution.
     The fourth and perhaps most important
free-expression safety valve is the public
domain. The Copyright Clause requires that
after a “limited time” of monopoly control,
creative works must enter the public
domain, where they are free for anyone to
publish, sell, adapt, translate, record, or
perform. And “limited time,” as we have
seen, meant only 14 years, renewable for
another 14, under the nation’s first copy-
right law. As the 19th century legal scholar
and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story
wrote, the purpose of the Copyright Clause
was to “admit the people at large, after a
short interval, to the full possession and
enjoyment of all writings and inventions
without restraint.”37
     One reason an expanding public domain
is so important is that creative works grow
from past achievements; they do not, as
law professor Jessica Litman quipped, just
rise full-grown, like “Aphrodite from the
foam of the sea.”38 Justice Story explained
not long after the Copyright Clause was
written that “few, if any, things” are
“strictly new and original throughout. Every
book in literature, science and art borrows,
and must necessarily borrow, ... much
which was well known and used before.”39
From Shakespeare to James Joyce,
Michelangelo to Andy Warhol, creators and
inventors have echoed, copied, mocked,
and transformed previous works. Rock
music, folk, blues, and jazz all borrow
themes, riffs, and melodies from earlier
creations.40
     In addition to this vital role in fermenting
creativity, the public domain also promotes
preservation and scholarship. Historians
can reproduce pictures, letters, sound
recordings, and other expression without
pursuing the frequently futile quest for
copyright permission. Even when owners
can be found, they may refuse permission,
or impose unpalatable conditions. Report-
edly, the estate of songwriter Lorenz Hart
refuses any biographer who mentions
Hart’s homosexuality to reprint his lyrics.
Likewise, the playwright Lillian Hellman
was reputed not to have licensed any
except “first-class” productions of her
works. Ted Hughes, widower of the poet
Sylvia Plath, strictly controlled what
biographers and anthologizers could say
about her life and their stormy marriage in
exchange for permission to quote her
poems or letters.41
     For scholars and archivists, fair use is
not an adequate substitute for the public
domain. It is often impossible to predict
whether a particular borrowing will be
considered fair by a judge or jury, and,
perhaps more important, these issues are
seldom decided in court – most publishers
simply will not print copyright-protected
documents without permission. This
includes even unpublished letters, drawings,
and photographs.
     Finally, popular access is greatly
enhanced once works enter the public
domain. Material that is unavailable, or
available only in expensive editions, can,
once copyright expires, be published and
distributed in wide variety, more cheaply,
and often with new introductory or supple-
mentary texts. The year after Willa
Cather’s My Antonia entered the public
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domain, seven new editions appeared, with
different introductions and varying prices –
a pattern that is typical.42 Libraries can
freely copy and disseminate letters, photo-
graphs, and news articles once they are in
the public domain. Amateur or impecunious
theatrical troupes can perform musicals,
plays, and poems without paying often
prohibitive licensing fees.
     The copyright industry, by and large,
takes a less enthusiastic view of the public
domain’s virtues. Media companies say
that works are neglected and decay when
nobody with monopoly control is motivated
to preserve them. Paramount Pictures Vice
President Scott Martin recently gave an
example: the classic Frank Capra movie,
It’s a Wonderful Life, which entered the
public domain at the end of its first copy-
right term because its owner failed to file a
timely renewal application. As a result,
Martin wrote, “the film was endlessly
broadcast by local stations and cable
channels looking for no-cost program-
ming.” It was “sliced and diced” to fit into
time slots between commercials. “By the
1980s,” he said, “there were multiple
versions of the film, all in horrid condi-
tion.”43
     But once the owners of the underlying
rights to the story and music asserted their
claims, Martin says, the film was spruced
up, with marvelous results. “Only after the
copyrights in the underlying rights were
enforced was anyone willing to spend the
money necessary to restore and preserve
the film.”44
     There is another side to this story, of
course. Anyone who has been on an
airplane or watched movies on TV knows
that media companies frequently allow their
copyright-protected works to be “sliced and
diced” (and bowdlerized to eliminate
naughty words or scenes). The public
domain thus cannot be blamed for insults to
the integrity of creative works.
     Perhaps more important, all of those
allegedly “horrid” copies of It’s a Wonder-
ful Life enabled millions of people to see it.
The film “was actually a box-office flop at
the time of its release, and only became the
Christmas movie classic in the 1960s due to
repeated television showings at Christmas-
time.”45 It was thanks to the public domain
that the film achieved classic-movie status.
     Finally, Martin’s argument that works
will only be preserved if their owners have
an incentive to keep them profitable applies
to relatively few creations. For most works,
which no longer have commercial value,
entry into the public domain is crucial
because only then can archivists preserve
them without going through the laborious,
expensive, and often futile process of trying
to locate and secure permission from
copyright owners.
     The public domain is a critical part of
the “difficult balance” underlying the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause. Yet in the
past century,
Congress has
stretched the
“limited time”
contemplated by
the Copyright
Clause to the
point where it
now, as one
scholar quipped,
resembles
perpetual copyright “on the installment
plan.”46 From the original 14 years, renew-
able for another 14, in the 1790 Act,
Congress in 1831 extended the term to 28
years, renewable for another 14; and again
in 1909, to 28 years, renewable for another
28.47 Between 1962 and 1974, Congress
“Even a well-
trained copyright
lawyer cannot say
with certainty
where the line lies
between fair and
unfair uses.”
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enacted nine short-term extensions, to
prevent older works from entering the
public domain while it prepared a massive
new copyright law that finally passed in
1976.48
     This 1976 law, following the interna-
tional Berne Convention, adopted a flexible
– and lengthy – “limited time”: the life of
the author plus 50 years for individuals and
their estates; 75 years from publication or
100 years from creation, whichever expired
first, for corporations holding copyrights on
works created by their employees (so-
called “works made for hire”).49
     Then came the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1998, which added
another 20 years across the board. Under
the Sonny Bono law, the “limited time” of
copyright is now the author’s life plus 70
years for individuals, and 95 years for most
copyrights held by corporations.50 Like the
previous extensions, the law expands
copyright not only for future works, but for
existing ones, even though their authors –
many of them now dead – obviously don’t
need any additional incentive to create
them.
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Freezing the Public Domain: The
Battle Over the Sonny Bono Law
The Politics of Copyright
Extension
Chapter 2:
     The Sonny Bono law was the result of
strenuous lobbying by the copyright
industry. Often called the “Mickey Mouse
Law” because of the Walt Disney
Company’s central role in urging its
passage, it prevented the original image
and character of Mickey, who made his
screen debut in 1928 in the film Steamboat
Willie, from entering the public domain in
2003. Disney and other film companies
pushed aggressively for term extension,
smoothing the way, as one journalist noted,
with “well-targeted campaign contribu-
tions.”51
     During the three years it took to pass
the Sonny Bono law, media companies and
their political action committees (PACs)
gave more than $6.5 million in campaign
contributions to members of Congress.
Representative Howard Coble, a co-
sponsor of the law, received $63,000 in
individual and PAC contributions. Senate
co-sponsor Orrin Hatch received $50,000
from large donors, including the major
movie studios, the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America (MPAA), and ASCAP.52
     Senator Patrick Leahy, who publicly
forgoes PAC contributions, received nearly
$20,000 from individual Disney employees.
(He was the ranking minority member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee that
passed on the bill.) Time Warner employ-
ees gave Leahy $36,000. Disney chairman
Michael Eisner flew to Washington to meet
with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott,
who then signed on as a co-sponsor.
Journalist Daren Fonda noted: “That day,
Lott’s campaign committee received a
check from Disney for $1,000 and 11 days
later, Disney donated $20,000 in unre-
stricted ‘soft money’ to the National
Republican Senatorial Committee.”53
     Given all this industry largesse, it is
fitting that the Sonny Bono law bears the
name of an entertainer-turned-politician.
Mary Bono, who succeeded to her
husband’s seat in Congress after his death,
explained: “Sonny wanted the term of
copyright protection to last forever,” but “I
am informed by staff that such a change
would violate the Constitution.” She
suggested that Congress consider the
proposal of the MPAA’s Jack Valenti, for
“forever less one day.”54
Defending the Public Domain:
E l d r e d  v. Ashcroft
     The effect of the Sonny Bono law was
to prevent more than 400,000 works from
the 1920s and ’30s from entering the public
domain.55 Most of them were obscure
creations without commercial value, though
often with considerable historical interest.
But many famous works also had their
copyrights extended – among them, F.
Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby,
Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises,
Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain,
the iconic American film The Jazz Singer,
the book and score to the musical Show
Boat, songs by Cole Porter, and the
children’s classic Winnie the Pooh.56
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     As the briefs filed in the legal case that
challenged the Sonny Bono law attested,
the effects were dramatic. The College Art
Association, in a friend-of-the court (or
amicus curiae)
brief joined by the
National Humani-
ties Alliance and
other groups
whose members
study visual art,
explained that
scholars assem-
bling texts and
databases often
cannot locate the
owners of copy-
rights in education-
ally valuable
letters, songs,
photos, and other documents. Indeed, most
authors have neither the time nor the
financial resources to do this gritty work of
tracking down copyright permissions –
though publishers generally expect them to.
Without permissions, most publishers won’t
include the materials.
     As a result, said the College Art Asso-
ciation, there are “gaping holes” in such
documentary compilations as The Video
Encyclopedia of the Twentieth Century,
a resource popular with researchers and
teachers, and “Who Built America?,” an
award-winning CD-ROM series for high
school and college students containing
primary sources from the 1930s. The
compilers of “Who Built America?” had
great difficulty finding copyright owners,
and those they found sometimes wanted
large fees even where the works in ques-
tion had no commercial value. Thus, they
were forced to omit the Depression Era
demagogue Huey Long’s campaign song,
“Every Man a King,” as well as many clips
from popular films of the time. They
substituted government documents or other
works in the public domain, but the result
was an unbalanced picture of the era.
     The brief described an art historian who
was refused permission to use a photo of
Pablo Picasso and his daughter because
the copyright owner disagreed with the
historian’s analysis of Picasso’s work. A
publisher that planned a new critical edition
of Cane, by the Harlem Renaissance
author Jean Toomer, in part to counterbal-
ance the bias against Toomer reflected in
the only available edition, could not go
ahead because of the copyright term
extension on Cane. “In the past,” the brief
said, “researchers could anticipate and plan
on new material becoming available for
unrestricted use on a constant and continu-
ing basis.” But the law’s 20-year “morato-
rium on the public domain” upsets those
expectations and penalizes scholars,
museums, teachers, and historians. All this
in the interest of further enriching a rela-
tively few copyright owners “who already
have received significant value from their
ownership under the preexisting term.”57
     The suit challenging the Sonny Bono
law started with a small online publisher
named Eric Eldred. He began the nonprofit
Eldritch Press in 1995, “inspired to help his
triplet daughters wade through the antique
prose of [Nathaniel Hawthorne’s] The
Scarlet Letter, which they were assigned
to read in middle school.”58 Eldred
searched for Internet resources to assist
them, including accessible, comprehensible,
and reader-friendly copies of the text. As
his lawyer Lawrence Lessig tells the story,
what Eldred found online “was essentially
unusable.”59 The Web versions had typos,
relied on outdated texts, or were crudely
scanned.
Eric Eldred at the Supreme Court.
Photo by Declan McCullagh
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     Beginning with Hawthorne, Eldred
began to provide easily readable texts of
other public-domain works, by such major-
league authors as Joseph Conrad, Anton
Chekhov, and Henry James. The daily “hit
count” on his Web site grew to 20,000. In
1997, the National Endowment for the
Humanities recognized Eldritch Press’s
Hawthorne site as “one of the 20 best
humanities sites on the Web.”60
     Eldred was set to add a Sherwood
Anderson story collection and a book of
Robert Frost poems, among other works
whose copyrights were about to expire,
when the Sonny Bono Act delayed their
entry into the public domain by 20 years.
He began to complain publicly, and one
news story caught Lessig’s attention. With
Harvard Law School’s Berkman Center
for Internet & Society, Lessig framed a
legal challenge to the Sonny Bono law.
     They had three legal arguments. First,
by freezing the public domain, the Sonny
Bono law violates the right to free expres-
sion and access to ideas, as embodied in
the First Amendment. Next, by extending
copyright for already-created works, the
law violates the Copyright Clause require-
ment of limited times. Finally, the law does
not “promote the progress of science and
useful arts,” as required by the opening
words of the Copyright Clause, because
there is obviously no need to provide
further motivation for authors to produce
works that already exist.
     Other plaintiffs in the case that became
known as Eldred v. Ashcroft included a
publisher of books on genealogy and local
history, a church choir director, a classical
sheet music company, the American Film
Heritage Association, and Dover Publica-
tions, famous for quality reprints of public
domain works. Before copyright extension,
Dover planned to reprint Kahlil Gibran’s
The Prophet, originally published in 1923.
The choir director, who limits her selections
to public domain works because of the high
cost of copyrighted sheet music, planned to
perform work by Ralph Vaughn Williams
and Edward Elgar. The classical sheet
music company was preparing to publish
compositions by Béla Bartok, Maurice
Ravel, and Richard Strauss, which were
about to enter the public domain, and
distribute them to school and community
orchestras.61
     This was the first time anyone had
brought a legal challenge to copyright
extension, and the lower courts made quick
work of Lessig’s claims. A federal judge
dismissed the suit, and in February 2001,
the U.S. Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 vote,
affirmed. The judges in the majority ruled
that neither the opening words of the
Copyright Clause nor its reference to
“limited times” prevents Congress from
extending copyright as often as it likes. The
one dissenting judge pointed out that
repeatedly extending copyright is funda-
mentally equivalent to creating a perpetual,
unlimited – and therefore clearly unconsti-
tutional – term.62
E l d r e d  i n  t h e  S u p r e m e
C o u r t
     By this time, news of both the Sonny
Bono law and the Eldred case had spread.
Librarians, scholars, activists, and many
others grew concerned about copyright’s
continuing impoverishment of the public
domain. “Free Mickey” became the
rallying cry of those supporting Eldred.63
After the Supreme Court agreed to review
the case, a large coalition of law profes-
sors, library associations, archivists, writers,
computer professionals, arts and humanities
alliances, and media centers weighed in
with amicus curiae briefs on Eldred’s
behalf.
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     In all, fourteen amicus briefs on
Eldred’s side were submitted, with a total
of 141 signers. They included groups
ranging from the National Writers Union
and the College Art Association to the
Association of American Physicians &
Surgeons and Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility. Their aim was to
bring home to the Supreme Court justices
the real cultural costs of ever-longer
copyright terms, and consequent freezing
of the public domain.
     The brief from online archiving projects,
for example, described how Internet public-
domain publishing has revived countless
forgotten or hard-to-find works. Archiving
projects now “digitize and distribute millions
of out-of-copyright books, movies, and
music ... materials that commercial publish-
ers, distributors, and rights-holders have
effectively
abandoned.”
While media
companies that
own the copy-
rights “often let
these films
decay and
books disappear,
this material is
invaluable to
scholars re-
searching our history, artists developing
new art forms, and anyone seeking to
explore our culture.”
     To reclaim these works, they must be in
the public domain. Finding and paying
copyright owners is untenable, given the
millions of documents involved. And in any
case, the vast majority of works affected
by the Sonny Bono law – published more
than 70 years ago – “are not available from
copyright owners at any price” because the
owners cannot be found.
     The brief offered as one example the
Steven Spielberg Digital Yiddish Library,
with about 12,000 digitized works, which
“has helped turn a dying literature into ‘the
most in-print literature on the planet.’” This
online archive “brings both a literature and
an enriched understanding of the Yiddish
culture to people across the globe.”
     By contrast, “other parts of our culture
and heritage remain obscured behind the
wall of copyright.” Early issues of The
New Yorker, Time, Readers Digest, and
other magazines “provide an unparalleled
window into early 20th century American
life and culture.” But unlike the Yiddish
treasures in the Spielberg archive, few of
these magazines can be found online
because they are still under copyright. Until
they fall into the public domain, the process
of clearing rights for each article, drawing,
and photograph makes digital archiving
practically impossible.
     The archives’ brief also pointed to
movies, that “rare medium of full immer-
sion,” with unmatched power “to transport
us to distant times and places.” Film
“literally allows us to bear witness,”
whether to the police violence inflicted on
civil rights era protesters, Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s leadership of the 1965 march on
Selma, Alabama, or countless other histori-
cal events. But as the public domain
recedes, teachers, students, scholars, and
the rest of the public are unable to see
these images.64
     Other support for Eldred came from
First Amendment lawyers, copyright
lawyers, writers, libraries, and economists.
The writers, among them William Gass,
Peter Matthiesen, Eva Hoffman, and
Ursula Leguin – all, of course, copyright
owners themselves – argued that a grow-
ing, healthy public domain is the necessary
Disney took
advantage of the
public domain in
creating Snow
White, Cinderella,
and other
classics.
Why Copyright Today Threatens Intellectual Freedom 19
source for new creation. They pointed out
that Disney, which worked so hard to
freeze the public domain by pushing for the
Sonny Bono law, nevertheless took advan-
tage of it many times in creating animated
versions of Snow White, Cinderella, The
Hunchback of Notre Dame, and other
classics. Indeed, Disney’s Steamboat
Willie was a parody of the classic Buster
Keaton movie, Steamboat Bill, Jr.65
     The economists’ brief argued that
copyright extension produced no economic
benefit – virtually no additional incentive to
create new works, and significantly higher
costs for “derivative works” such as
adaptations and performances. And as with
any monopoly, the elimination of competi-
tion increased costs to consumers.66
     Finally, a brief from the American
Association of Law Libraries, the Medical
Library Association, and other library
groups had particular relevance for schol-
arship and culture. These are the institu-
tions that preserve literature, art, science,
journalism, and other products of human
creativity, and make them available to all,
regardless of wealth. The brief described
Documenting the American South, an
electronic collection sponsored by the
University of North Carolina, which
provides no-fee access to more than 1,000
publications and manuscripts. This archive
includes Confederate imprints, Southern
literature, materials on the African Ameri-
can church, and about 160,000 pages of
slave narratives, of which, in many cases,
only a few hard copies exist. Before
digitization, hardly anyone got to see them.
Now they are accessed by 15-20 people
per day – well over 5,000 per year. The
project would be impossible without the
public domain.
     The librarians’ brief also addressed a
limited exemption in the Sonny Bono law
that allows them to reproduce and distrib-
ute works that are in their final 20 years of
copyright – but only if the works are not
currently profitable for their owners, and if
copies cannot be obtained “at a reasonable
price.” The exemption is so narrow, said
the librarians, that it “may ultimately do
little” to “mitigate the substantial burdens”
of the law.67
     The Department of Justice and the
copyright industry countered the outpouring
of briefs attacking the Sonny Bono law
with powerful arguments of their own. The
government’s brief emphasized how novel
Eldred’s claims were: Congress has been
extending copyrights on existing works for
200 years, and no one before had brought a
legal challenge arguing that “limited times”
cannot be extended or that the opening
words of the Copyright Clause (“to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful
arts”) mean that laws not shown to encour-
age new creations are beyond Congress’s
power. In any event, they argued, the
longer term would spur media companies to
invest in restoring and distributing old
works, and although not creative, these
activities also promote “science and useful
arts.”
     The government stressed that Con-
gress, not the courts, is the appropriate
branch of government to decide what
policy best serves art and culture. Indeed, it
insisted, for the courts to wade into this
area would require reviewing a multitude of
congressional judgments – among them,
that longer copyright protection, not the
public domain, advances film preservation,
and that the media industry, if it receives
additional profits, will invest in more new
creations. The government’s lawyers
warned the Supreme Court that if it starts
subjecting copyright term extensions to
First Amendment scrutiny, it will end up in
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the impossible position of second-guessing
Congress’s judgments on “each and every
feature” of copyright law.68
    As if to outdo Eldred’s supporters, those
on the government’s side filed a total of 18
amicus curiae briefs. Several came from
the copyright industry – the MPAA, AOL
Time Warner, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA). Others
came from celebrated copyright holders or
their estates – George Gershwin, George
Balanchine, and David Mamet (among
others who signed on to a brief from the
Association of American Publishers); the
Songwriters Guild of America; and
AmSong, Inc. (an “organization dedicated
to the protection of musical copyrights,”
whose members include Bob Dylan, Carlos
Santana, Don Henley, and Thelonious
Monk, Jr.).
    The common themes of these briefs
supporting copyright extension were the
financial and proprietary interests of
creative artists and their heirs. They also
argued that copyright holders make good
use of already-created works through
adaptations and movie deals. But they
failed to acknowledge the even greater use
that would occur if the works were allowed
to enter the public domain.
     A brief that was particularly aggressive
(and humorless) came from Dr. Seuss
Enterprises, the heirs of E.B. White (author
of the timeless Stuart Little and
Charlotte’s Web), and Madeleine and
Barbara Bemelmans (heirs of Ludwig, the
author of the Madeline books). They
argued that enriching the public domain
was not a purpose of the Copyright Clause
at all, and in fact that allowing works to
enter the public domain has pernicious
effects. “While in no way seeking to
disparage” Eldred and his fellow plaintiffs,
they said, “others having access to works
through the public domain make use of
well-known characters to glorify drugs or
to create pornography. These uses, espe-
cially for children’s works, demean and
dilute the original works and discourage
their continued popularity.”69
     The assumption of these copyright
owners was that cultural icons like Dr.
Seuss should be immune from irreverent or
scandalous uses. But this misapprehends
the role of mockery and cultural quotation
in a system of free expression. These
writers’ estates seemed unwilling to accept
that the fame of works like The Cat in the
Hat or Charlotte’s Web makes them
natural targets for take-offs and parodies.
They should no more have immunity from
such critiques or humor than the Walt
Disney Company should be able to sup-
press the famous “Disneyland Memorial
Orgy,” a cartoon created by Mad maga-
zine illustrator Wally Wood and published
as a poster by The Realist magazine in the
1960s.70 The “Orgy” depicts Mickey,
Minnie, and other Disney characters in
sexually suggestive situations. Although
Disney has tried over the years to stop
distribution of the “Orgy,” it remains an
important wry comment on the sexlessness
of “Disneyfied” American culture.
     Another common argument of those
defending the Sonny Bono law was that the
copyright system, by recognizing fair use
and the idea/expression dichotomy, already
accommodates First Amendment rights.
The government’s brief elaborated on this
theme. Just as in the Nation case, it said,
where the Supreme Court rejected an
argument that the public interest in Gerald
Ford’s memoirs required a new exception
to copyright, free speech safeguards such
as fair use already “protect First Amend-
ment interests and render further judicial
intervention unnecessary.”71
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     Finally, the government and its support-
ers emphasized the need for “harmoniza-
tion” of U.S. copyright law with Europe’s.
They said Congress was right to decide
that in the interests of international trade,
and of protecting America’s number two
export, popular culture, U.S. copyright
holders should not have any less protection
abroad than their foreign competitors.
Under the Berne Convention, countries
need only give the same copyright protec-
tion to a foreign work that it has in its
country of origin. Hence, without the Sonny
Bono law, U.S. copyrights would be
protected in Europe for the life of the
author plus 50 years (as provided by the
1976 Copyright Act) rather than life plus 70
– the term in European Union countries.72
     But the Sonny Bono law did not in fact
make U.S. copyright terms consistent with
Europe’s. European Union countries give
70 years for works owned by corporations.
The Sonny Bono Act gives corporations 95
years from the date of publication or 120
years from the date of creation, whichever
expires first – that is, at least 25 years
longer than many countries in Europe.73
     Moreover, most European countries
don’t have an equivalent of the U.S. “work
for hire” doctrine, which gives corporations
the copyright in works created by their
employees. In Europe, the life of the author
– or multiple authors in the case of movies
– is often used to calculate copyright terms
for works by corporate employees. Hence,
the goal of harmonizing U.S. and European
copyright law is stymied at the outset by a
major difference in the treatment of works
by corporate employees. The U.S. Register
of Copyrights admitted to Congress before
passage of the Sonny Bono law that the
20-year extension would not make Ameri-
can law consistent with Europe’s.74
     On October 9, 2002, the case of Eldred
v. Ashcroft was argued before a packed
audience in the Supreme Court. Several of
the justices seemed incensed by the Sonny
Bono law.
Sandra
Day
O’Connor
said the
law “flies
directly in
the face”
of the
“very
short
term” of
copyright
that the
framers of
the
Constitu-
tion had in mind. But she wondered
whether this necessarily made it unconsti-
tutional. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had a
variant on the same question: should there
be any judicial review of Congress’s
decisions in this area, she asked Lessig;
and if so, what standard should apply?
     Justice Stephen Breyer was skeptical of
the government’s claim that Congress can
legitimately promote “science and useful
arts” not by encouraging creativity but
simply by rewarding the distributors of
already-created works. He asked the
government’s lawyer, Solicitor General Ted
Olson, whether Congress could therefore
pass a law granting copyrights for the
Bible, Shakespeare, or Ben Jonson? The
question was obviously rhetorical, but
Olson was reluctant to say that even this
would be unconstitutional.
     Several other justices seemed uncom-
fortable with the law’s extension of existing
copyrights. But O’Connor asked Lessig
Part of the “Disneyland Memorial
Orgy” by Wally Wood.
22      “The Progress of Science and Useful Arts”
whether invalidating it would not doom the
1976 Copyright Act, which also added to
the term of existing copyrights. Breyer
opined that invalidating the ’76 law would
produce “chaos” that would be “horren-
dous.” Lessig responded that the Court
could make a distinction because of the
settled expectations created by the ’76
Act.75
     After the argument, Lessig reported
that research on the books and movies
whose copyrights were extended in 1976
indicates that the vast majority are no
longer commercially available; hence, “a
surprisingly small amount of work would be
affected” if the ’76 Act were invalidated.76
     Nevertheless, this question about the
vulnerability of the 1976 copyright law
loomed in the justices’ minds. On January
15, 2003, they upheld the Sonny Bono law
by a vote of 7-2.
     Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court
made no mention of the ways that a
stagnant public domain impoverishes art
and culture, as the College Art Association
and others had documented in their briefs.
Instead, she condemned Justice Breyer,
one of the two dissenters, for making
“abundant policy arguments” instead of
sticking to legal precedent. Breyer’s
impassioned dissent relied extensively on
the briefs, noting for example that about
350,000 films, songs, and other works with
little or no commercial value are still frozen
in “a kind of intellectual purgatory” be-
cause of the Sonny Bono law.77
     Ginsburg’s opinion gave short shrift to
the free-expression issue. The Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment “were
adopted close in time,” she said – indicating
that, “in the Framers’ view, copyright’s
limited monopolies are compatible with free
speech principles.” Her opinion did not
consider that those “limited monopolies”
lasted quite a short time in the 18th century,
or whether “limited” is even an appropriate
description for a period that spans nearly a
century – and often longer. But in any
event, Ginsburg said, “copyright law
contains built-in First Amendment accom-
modations” – in particular, the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy and the defense of fair
use.78
     What Ginsburg overlooked here, as law
professor Jack Balkin soon pointed out, “is
that the limitation of copyright terms is also
a central important built-in feature of
copyright law that protects free speech
values.” Balkin added: “In the Court’s
eagerness to get rid of the First Amend-
ment claims in this case, it has created truly
bad law that will cause problems for
freedom of expression for many years to
come.”79
     The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in
Eldred v. Ashcroft gives Congress near-
total discretion to decide what is an appro-
priate copyright term – to extend the
“limited time” yet again for virtually any
period. As Justice John Paul Stevens noted
in a dissenting opinion, only one year’s
worth of creative works entered the public
domain in the preceding 80 years. By
allowing Congress to extend existing
copyrights ad infinitum, Stevens said, the
majority ignored “the central purpose” of
the Copyright Clause.80
     Justice Ginsburg was certainly right that
copyright term extension is an issue of
policy. Of course, this doesn’t disqualify the
courts from weighing in; they often con-
sider policy arguments, especially in
constitutional cases. As Justice Breyer
said, “judicial vigilance” is necessary “if we
are to avoid the monopolies and consequent
restrictions of expression” that the Copy-
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right Clause and the First Amendment
were both intended to prevent.81
     In an editorial, The New York Times
agreed. Calling the public domain “the
great democratic seedbed of artistic
creation,” the Times opined that the Su-
preme Court’s decision “may make consti-
tutional sense, but it does not serve the
public well.”82
The Difficult Balance Revisited:
What is a “Limited Term”?
     Copyright term extension is an issue
that splits the worlds of art and culture.
First Amendment experts disagreed on the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono law.
Bob Dylan, Carlos Santana, and many
other artists urged Congress to pass it.
Since existing law already gave them
copyright control for life plus 50 years, they
were presumably concerned about the
ability of their grandchildren and great-
grandchildren to profit from their works.
Understandably (but incorrectly), they
thought of their creations as their perma-
nent property.
     The Eldred case was not an easy one
as a matter of constitutional law. As the
government argued, how is a court to
decide what is an appropriate, or constitu-
tionally permissible, “limited time”? This
does seem essentially a judgment for
Congress to make.
     But if “limited time” can really mean
hundreds of years, or can be extended by
Congress indefinitely, then the public
domain becomes a dead letter – which is
certainly not the outcome intended by the
drafters of the Copyright Clause.
     The Supreme Court’s failure to come to
grips with the problem of the disappearing
public domain suggests that this issue must
be resolved in the public policy arena. And
despite the disappointingly wooden Su-
preme Court decision in Eldred, the
litigation may have had the salutary effect
of taking the issue out of the legislative
shadows and into the light of policy debate.
As one journalist noted, public awareness
might now persuade Congress to revisit the
issue and, at the very least, allow copy-
rights to lapse “unless owners make an
effort to renew them.”83
     Lawrence Lessig elaborated, arguing
that it is not necessary to lock up all works
created after 1923 in order to go on
providing profits for the 2% of them that
“continue to be commercially exploited.”
Just as patent holders must pay a fee every
few years to continue their patents, “the
same principle could be applied to copy-
right.”84 Scholars, archivists, artists, and the
reading and listening public could then at
least use materials whose owners do not
bother to renew.
     As Lessig and many others have
pointed out, the stakes are higher than ever.
The Internet for the first time enables
people the world over to read, view, and
learn from works that in pre-digital times
were buried in library stacks, private
collections, attics, or basements. The
immense promise of global communication,
preservation, and intellectual exchange
should not be squandered by the calcifica-
tion of the public domain.
24      “The Progress of Science and Useful Arts”
Chapter 3:
The Ins and Outs of Circumvention:
The Digi ta l  Mi l lennium Copyr ight Act
     After the Supreme Court agreed to
review the Eldred case, one reporter made
the connection between the Sonny Bono
law and other efforts to strengthen copy-
right control by observing that term exten-
sion is part of “a larger fight that pits
copyright holders against the spread of
technology that allows almost anyone to
easily copy and distribute almost any work
online.”85 The main battleground of that
“larger fight” is the apocalyptically named
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or
DMCA.
     The DMCA had its origins in a 1994
“Green Paper” that the Clinton Administra-
tion produced in response to industry
concerns about the potential for wide-
spread copying and sharing of books,
articles, movies, music, and virtually any
other expression online. The problem of
electronic piracy was – and remains – a
serious one. The question is how to
address it without undermining copyright’s
free-expression safety valves. The Green
Paper took a radical approach, asserting
that every reading or viewing of a work on
a computer should be considered a repro-
duction requiring copyright permission.86
     This approach dramatically restricts
both fair use and the first sale rule online.
It prevents anyone who legitimately
accesses or purchases a document from
making a backup copy or forwarding it to a
friend, without a new permission. It locks
up everything that in the offline world
could be freely browsed in a bookstore or
library.
     As Professor Pamela Samuelson put it
in an article headlined “ALERT – Stop the
Clinton Copyright Grab”: “Browsing
through a borrowed book, lending a maga-
zine to a friend, copying a news article for
your files – all seem innocuous enough. But
the Clinton administration plans to make
such activities illegal for works distributed
via digital networks.”87
     Starting from this radical premise,
Congress now crafted a law to help the
industry prevent unauthorized access to
copyrighted material. The DMCA essen-
tially gives the force of law to the
industry’s digital rights management
techniques. Indeed, the DMCA goes
beyond making it a crime to circumvent
encryption devices in order to access
copyrighted works. It also criminalizes the
very creation and distribution of circumven-
tion tools.88
     These “tools” provisions of the DMCA
(sometimes called the “anti-trafficking”
provisions) exceed anything previously
contemplated in copyright law. For instead
of penalizing copyright infringement, they
ban research and communication of
information that might be used for infringe-
ment. Like efforts to ban the VCR, re-
jected by the Supreme Court in the 1984
Sony case, banning circumvention tools is
troubling because they have many legiti-
mate “non-infringing” uses.
     Supporters of the DMCA respond that
it accommodates fair use and other tradi-
Locking Up Expression and
Shrinking Fair Use
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tional checks on copyright monopolies. For
example, it only prohibits circumvention of
electronic locks for purposes of access, not
for purposes of copying. But the “tools”
provisions ban technologies designed for
access or copying. Thus, as Jessica Litman
wrote, consumers wanting to make legiti-
mate use of copyrighted works must come
up with ways to circumvent encryption on
their own.89 And they cannot share what
they discover unless they are willing to risk
being sued or prosecuted for “trafficking”
in circumvention tools.
     The law has a few narrow exemptions.
One permits “nonprofit libraries, archives,
and educational institutions” to use circum-
vention tools to access a work – but “solely
in order to make a good faith determination
of whether to acquire a copy,” and only if
the work “is not reasonably available in
another form.” Another exception permits
“reverse engineering” in very limited
circumstances once a person has already
“lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of
a computer program.” Still another allows
research designed to “analyze flaws and
vulnerabilities of encryption technolo-
gies.”90 But in each case, using the exemp-
tion is difficult because manufacture and
distribution of the necessary tools is illegal.
     The DMCA acknowledges the impor-
tance of fair use. It directs the Librarian of
Congress (after investigation by the Copy-
right Office) to decide every three years
whether anybody seeking access to any
“particular class of works” for legitimate
aims such as fair use is likely to be “ad-
versely affected” by the law.91 But in 2000,
after receiving hundreds of comments from
educational and civil liberties groups on the
importance of circumvention to the exer-
cise of fair use, the Copyright Office
recommended only two narrow exemptions
to the access ban of the DMCA: lists of
Web sites blocked by Internet filters, and
works made inaccessible because of
“malfunction, damage, or obsoleteness” of
encryption devices. In late 2003, the Copy-
right Office added two more exceptions –
for “computer programs and video games
distributed in formats that have become
obsolete,” and for “literary works distrib-
uted in e-book format,” when all existing e-
book editions contain access controls that
block read-aloud functions and other
software useful to the visually impaired.  92
     Like copyright term extension, the
DMCA has been defended as necessary to
harmonize U.S. with international law. Two
treaties crafted by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) oblige
member countries to “provide adequate
legal protection and effective legal rem-
edies” against circumvention of electronic
locks on copyrighted works. According to
the Copyright Office, the DMCA simply
“implements the WIPO treaties.”93
     But the head of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office acknowledged that the treaties
do not require the DMCA’s “device-
oriented” approach – as opposed to the
more traditional “conduct-oriented” ap-
proach that targets copyright infringers and
not the researchers who create new
technologies.94
Effects of  the DMC A
CASES INVOLVING SCHOLARSHIP
     One of the first applications of the
DMCA was against scholars. In early
2001, a group of companies calling them-
selves the Secure Digital Music Initiative
issued a “Public Challenge” to computer
experts to try to circumvent the water-
marks they had developed to prevent
unauthorized accessing or copying of
musical recordings. Edward Felten and
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fellow scientists from Princeton University,
Rice University, and Xerox Corporation
cracked the codes, and were preparing to
discuss the results of their research at a
U.S. Navy-sponsored conference when
they received a letter from the RIAA, the
music industry trade group. The letter, also
sent to Princeton and Navy officials,
threatened legal action under the DMCA if
the researchers published or publicized
their work.
     The scientists were both incensed and
intimidated. They withdrew their paper
from the conference but,
represented by the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), they also sued the
trade group to challenge
the threatened use of the
DMCA to suppress their
research results. The
RIAA now backed off,
saying that its letter was “a mistake” –
although reserving the right to threaten
other scholars in the future. The Depart-
ment of Justice moved to dismiss the case,
arguing that it was “not ripe” because the
RIAA was no longer threatening to sue.95
     The government also argued that the
DMCA did not cover Felten’s research.
This was because his decryption programs
were not specifically designed or marketed
with the aim of accessing copyrighted
material. Instead, they were developed “to
further scientific research into access
controls.” Like the RIAA, though, the
government hedged its bets, adding:
      Individual scientists along with Usenix,
an association of more than 10,000 technol-
ogy researchers, contested the govern-
ment’s argument for dismissing the case.
They focused on the DMCA’s chill on
academic research, especially given the
possibility of further industry threats. They
also pointed out that, contrary to the gov-
ernment’s claim, Felten plainly had an
intent to access copyrighted materials – the
object of the SDMI’s “Challenge,” after all,
was to circumvent the watermarks. What
Felten did not have was an intent to
infringe copyright.
     In the end, though, the federal judge
dismissed the case because he did not think
there was a sufficiently live controversy.
By then, Felten had presented his findings
at a Usenix symposium.97
     Russian researchers were not so
fortunate. In July 2001, federal agents
arrested Dmitri Sklyarov, a young Russian
programmer, at a conference in Nevada
after he presented parts of his dissertation
on “eBooks Security – Theory and Prac-
tice.” The paper described the Advanced
eBook Processor, a program that disabled
the Adobe company’s eBook Reader,
encryption software for electronic books.
Its major purpose was to allow buyers of e-
books to translate them into Portable
Document Format (PDF), then move them
to other machines for more convenient
reading, printing, copying, or rearranging,
much of which would qualify as fair use.
The program was legal in Russia where
Sklyarov had created it as an employee of
the ElcomSoft company.98
This is not to say that any con-
duct undertaken in an academic
context would be automatically
immune from DMCA liability.
Rather, it merely credits Plaintiffs’
allegation that their purpose is
in fact academic pursuit and
scientific advancement. In its
law enforcement capacity, the
Department remains free
to make its own determination of
what any actor’s actual purpose is.96
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     The arrest of a young scholar for
discussing technical research at a confer-
ence caused quite a stir, and in December,
the government agreed to “defer” its
charges against Sklyarov in exchange for
his agreement to testify at a criminal
prosecution of ElcomSoft. In the agree-
ment, Sklyarov acknowledged that the
“only purpose” of the Advanced eBook
Processor was to “create an unprotected
copy” of an encrypted document.99 Like
Felten, though, Sklyarov said he had no
intent to infringe copyrights, or assist in
infringement.
     A few months later, ElcomSoft moved
to dismiss the criminal charges, arguing,
among other things, that the DMCA’s ban
on anti-circumvention technology is uncon-
stitutional. The American Association of
Law Libraries, the Music Library Associa-
tion, EFF, and other groups supported the
company with a friend-of-the-court brief.
They argued that Adobe’s eBook Reader,
like other digital rights management tech-
nologies, was “designed to give publishers
nearly perfect control” over what lawful
owners of e-books can do with them –
including lending, printing, partial copying,
and other activities protected by the
concepts of first sale and fair use. By
backing up DRM with legal sanctions, the
DMCA deprived lawful e-book buyers of
their first sale and fair-use rights.100
     The judge was not persuaded, however,
and in May 2002, denied ElcomSoft’s
motion to dismiss the case. While acknowl-
edging that DRM tools embedded in
Adobe’s eBook Reader do restrict first sale
and fair use, he said Congress nevertheless
had the power to “sacrifice” these interests
and give DRM the force of law. He added
that the DMCA doesn’t eliminate fair use –
it just makes its exercise more difficult.
The fair user may have to retype portions
of text, or hand-copy them rather than
using the computer’s convenient cut-and-
paste functions; but the law does not
guarantee “the right to the most technologi-
cally convenient way to engage in fair
use.”101
     In December 2002, the criminal trial
against ElcomSoft began in federal court in
California. The distance between the two
sides could be gauged by their lawyers’
opening statements. The prosecutor labeled
ElcomSoft’s Advanced eBook Processor a
“burglar’s tool.” The company’s lawyer
said it was “a legitimate program never
used to infringe copyrights.”102
     In the end, a jury acquitted ElcomSoft,
finding that the company lacked criminal
intent. It is likely that the jury sensed
government overreaching. As online
commentator Walt Crawford reported,
“although Adobe hired two companies to
search for unauthorized books on the
Internet, the company never found any
indication that ElcomSoft’s software was
used to make illicit copies.”103
THE IRREPRESSIBLE “DECSS” CODE
     The early DMCA case that generated
the most heat involved neither e-books nor
music. Universal City Studios v. Corley
was the movie industry’s attempt to
suppress a decryption program called
DeCSS, which unlocks the industry’s
“Content Scramble System” (CSS) for
movies on DVD. DVD players come
equipped with descramblers; without them,
the disks would not play. But once un-
locked, DVDs can be played on computers
and other machines that lack descrambling
technology.
     DeCSS was created in 1999 by three
European programmers, one of them a
Norwegian 15 year-old, Jon Johansen,
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whose main interest was not pirating
movies but being able to play them on open
source Linux-based computers.104 The
MPAA filed a complaint against Johansen
in Norway, and a prosecutor responded by
bringing criminal charges. Meanwhile in the
U.S., Paramount, MGM, Columbia Pic-
tures, Time Warner, Disney, and Twentieth
Century Fox joined Universal City Studios
in a lawsuit to try and stop the spread of
DeCSS.
     The companies did not sue the hundreds
of Web publishers and activists who were
discussing, describing, and distributing
DeCSS online. (They did send “cease and
desist” letters to many sites, some of which
removed the program.) Their lawsuit
instead focused on Eric Corley, editor of
2600: The Hacker Quarterly and propri-
etor of the Web site 2600.com. 2600
published DeCSS as part of a news article
reporting on circumvention technology and
the larger political debate over encryption.
It was not clear why the studios chose to
sue only Corley and two others associated
with his Web site, but his lawyers sug-
gested one theory: Corley was “a gadfly in
the field of computer security, publishing
information that often embarrasses security
professionals.”105
     A federal judge, offended by the hacker
mentality and mindful of the industry’s
large investment in DVDs, issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, a court order forbidding
Corley and two of his colleagues from
publishing DeCSS or posting it on the
Internet. Later, the judge barred Corley
from hyperlinking to any sites where
DeCSS could be found.106
     Represented by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Corley appealed. His lawyers
argued that the injunction violated his First
Amendment right to publish truthful infor-
mation, that neither he nor anyone else the
movie studios could identify had actually
used DeCSS to violate copyright, and that
interpreting the DMCA to bar any “traf-
ficking” in codes like DeCSS essentially
eliminated fair use in the digital world, by
censoring technology that would enable fair
users to gain access to creative works. The
DMCA’s structure was “upside-down,”
they said – it threatened communication
among journalists and scholars by punishing
the distribution of information that might be
used for copyright infringement more
stringently than copyright infringement
itself.107
     The Corley case, involving DVDs,
epitomized the shrinking of fair use more
dramatically than the prosecution of
ElcomSoft, which involved e-books. For, as
the judge who refused to dismiss the
charges against ElcomSoft observed, those
wanting to copy portions of an e-book for
criticism, scholarship, or other fair uses can
still do so by laboriously re-typing selected
passages. With visual images, retyping just
doesn’t work. To obtain a film clip or even
a single frame for purposes of fair use, one
must copy it. And to copy it, if it is “copy-
protected” through DRM techniques, one
must use circumvention tools.
     Corley’s brief to the court of appeals
gave some examples. Princeton Professor
Peter Ramadge, a film scholar, wanted to
use DeCSS to facilitate his searching
through movies for particular images –
such as Humphrey Bogart in the familiar
act of smoking a cigarette. “Professor
Ramadge’s research relies on access to
digital video content like that found on
DVDs,” the brief explained. “Ordinary
VCR movies are insufficient. His use of
DVD movies would undoubtedly qualify as
fair use for research and scholarship.” But
without DeCSS, Ramadge had to rely for
his research on an “industrial partner that
could execute the needed license agree-
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ments,” resulting in access to only two full-
length movies.108
     Similarly, a friend-of-the-court brief
from two scholars asked the judges to
“imagine a professor of critical film theory
putting together a series of illustrations of
sexist or racist stereotyping in Hollywood
movies.” Or a professor of media law,
“who offers a short snippet of The Insider
to motivate discussion of the costs and
benefits of commercial media. These and
millions of other unsung acts of individual
creativity that rely on common cultural
materials are central to expressive free-
dom,” yet the DMCA makes such fair uses
virtually impossible.109
     Briefs filed by cryptographers, law
professors, the American Library Associa-
tion (ALA), and the ACLU gave still more
examples. Columbia law professor Jane
Ginsburg had “linked to sites where DeCSS
was posted in the course of teaching her
copyright course.” Protesters had worn T-
shirts “bearing portions of the DeCSS
source code.”110 (Indeed, shortly after the
court of appeals decided the Corley case,
it was reported that “DeCSS ties” bearing
portions of the code were available; and
composer Joe Wecker had written “DeCSS
(Descramble),” a song whose lyrics consist
of the DeCSS code.111)
     These examples suggested the practical
problems with a law that bans the ex-
change of computer codes. The prospect
of federal agents confiscating T-shirts or
wading into Professor Ginsburg’s class to
prevent hyperlinks to Web sites containing
DeCSS is sobering, to say the least.
     The U.S. government intervened in the
Corley case to defend the DMCA. Its
primary argument was that decryption
codes are simply not constitutionally
protected expression. They are merely a
functional means of accomplishing circum-
vention. But even if the First Amendment
protects code, the government said, broad
anti-trafficking rules are constitutional
because there is no
other way to
prevent piracy.
Noting “the epi-
demic-like propaga-
tion of circumven-
tion technology,”
the government said
that the Internet
“poses a unique
threat to the rights
of copyright own-
ers,” while “digital
technology enables
pirates to repro-
duce and distribute
perfect copies of works – at virtually no
cost at all to the pirate.”112
     The court of appeals basically agreed.
Although it ruled that computer programs
like DeCSS are speech within the meaning
of the First Amendment, nevertheless, it
said, the DMCA’s anti-tool provisions are
constitutional. They serve the important
purpose of protecting encryption devices,
which the judges analogized to burglar
alarms, or locks that property owners install
in their homes.
     Certainly, the appeals court judges
conceded, there is a free-expression prob-
lem with the DMCA, because it shrinks
opportunities for fair use. But this was a
choice for Congress to make. Besides,
neither the injunction against Corley nor the
DMCA itself prohibited fair use of en-
crypted works. They only limited access,
and ability to copy. True, such limitations
make fair use more difficult. But, said the
court, “we know of no authority for the
proposition that fair use, as protected by
the Copyright Act, much less the Constitu-
2600: The Hacker Quarterly.
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tion, guarantees copying by the optimum
method or in the identical format of the
original.”
     Thus, although Corley insisted that the
public “should not be relegated to a ‘horse
and buggy’ technique in making fair use of
DVD movies,” the appeals court judges
noted that people can still, without tools like
DeCSS, comment on encrypted films,
quote dialogue, and even record portions
“by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a
microphone at a monitor as it displays the
DVD movie.”113
     Here, though, the judges overlooked the
fact that without sophisticated and expen-
sive equipment, it is not possible success-
fully to videotape images from a computer
or television set.114
     But whatever the credibility of their
proposed alternatives for exercising fair
use rights, the judges in Corley were well
aware that the DMCA radically limits fair
use, not to mention the lending and sharing
that are ordinarily allowed by the first sale
rule. They simply concluded that Congress
had the authority to decide there was no
other reasonably effective way of stopping
piracy.
     It did not help that the judges were
irked by the defendants’ rebellious, anti-
corporate style. Both the trial and appeals
court judges noted that 2600, the name of
Corley’s site, was the hertz frequency “of a
signal that some hackers formerly used to
explore the entire telephone system.”
Furthermore, the trial court’s original order
had simply prohibited posting DeCSS; it
was extended to bar hyperlinks after
Corley defiantly announced his intention to
engage in “electronic civil disobedience” by
linking to other Web sites containing the
program. By the summer of 2000, there
were nearly 500 such sites.115 The appeals
court affirmed this controversial part of the
injunction, even though it is quite a stretch
to view the creation of a hyperlink as
equivalent to distributing a circumvention
tool within the meaning of the DMCA.
     More than a year after the industry’s
victory in Corley, the Norwegian criminal
prosecution against young Jon Johansen –
known as “DVD Jon” – went to trial. In
January 2003, Johansen, by now age 19,
was acquitted by a judge who ruled that he
had not violated any of Norway’s anti-
piracy laws by helping create the software,
because DeCSS itself is merely a tool, not
an act of copyright piracy. But prosecutors,
“on behalf of Hollywood studios,” lodged
an appeal, and as of late 2003, Johansen
was facing a second trial in the Norwegian
appeals court.116
     Soon after the Corley case ended, a
new battle over DeCSS erupted. A com-
pany called 321 Studios manufactures
DVD Copy Plus, a product that cracks
CSS encryption and enables DVD buyers
to make backup copies. Backups are
prudent because DVDs are fragile, and
many consumers like them because they
can eliminate annoying previews and
commercials. DVD Copy Plus basically
consists of freely available software,
including DeCSS, with a detailed instruction
manual. 321 Studios went to court for a
“declaratory judgment” that the product is
legal, after the MPAA threatened suit to
stop its sale.
     321 argued that making a backup copy
of a DVD that one already owns is a
legitimate fair use, not an infringement of
copyright. Simply because its product might
be used for illegal copying, the company
said, is not sufficient reason to outlaw it,
any more than it would be sufficient reason
to ban VCRs or photocopy machines.
Moreover, a movie on DVD may be in the
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public domain, no longer protected by
copyright, and thus legal for anyone to
copy. To interpret the DMCA so broadly as
to criminalize tools that allow legitimate
owners to copy public domain materials for
their own use and convenience, said 321,
would not only shrink fair use but violate
the First Amendment.117
     The movie studios countered that DVD
Copy Plus is nothing more than a burglar’s
tool, and hence violates the DMCA. By
this time, they had both the ElcomSoft and
Corley decisions to rely on. But 321 was
able to make use of the Supreme Court’s
recent Eldred decision in urging a nar-
rower interpretion of the DMCA. That is,
the Court in Eldred rejected a First
Amendment challenge to Congress’s 20-
year extension of copyright because it said
that sufficient free-expression protections –
such as fair use – are built into copyright
law. Without such protections, the copyright
system would no longer be consistent with
the First Amendment. Interpreting the
DMCA so broadly as to ban such con-
sumer-friendly products as DVD Copy
Plus would impermissibly upset the tradi-
tional copyright-free expression balance.
     The 321 case was argued before
federal Judge Susan Illston in May 2003.
Although Judge Illston said she was leaning
toward ruling for the studios, she had a few
telling questions for their attorneys. She
asked one of them “how, once a copyright
expires, a work would ever enter the public
domain if studios continued to produce
encrypted copies?” A journalist reported
that the attorney “didn’t have a good
answer.” Likewise, the judge asked:
“‘What about Siskel & Ebert?’ If a studio
refuses to cooperate, how could a movie
reviewer include a clip?” The attorney
responded that “‘fair use is not a constitu-
tional right.’”118
     As of late 2003, Judge Illston had not
made a decision. But as one reporter
commented:
     Yet another angle on DeCSS encryption
involved not the DMCA but California
“trade secrets” law. In January 2000,
responding to a suit by the movie industry, a
California judge issued a preliminary
injunction forbidding a number of Web sites
from posting or distributing DeCSS, or any
“master keys,” “algorithms,” or other
information about DVD encryption
codes.120 This judge found that DVD
encryption is a “trade secret” and that
DeCSS reveals the secret, in violation of
California law.
     Only one of the defendants, Andrew
Bunner, appealed. He won a reversal from
the California Court of Appeals, which said
that computer programs like DeCSS are
protected by the First Amendment, and that
the order
banning their
dissemination
was an
unconstitu-
tional prior
restraint –
censoring
“pure speech”
before it happens. Prior restraints are
“highly disfavored” as a matter of long-
established First Amendment law; and the
In many ways, the horse is out
of the barn. The DeCSS program
is widely available on the Internet
and users can make pirate copies
of any DVD. Despite legal
injunctions, many sites sell T-shirts
with the outlaw code printed on
them. Until the studios obtained a
sealing order, the code was
available in a case file at the Santa
Clara County Superior Court.119
The judges in
Corley were well
aware that the
DMCA radically
limits fair use.
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industry’s right to protect its “economically
valuable trade secret,” the appeals court
said, is not “more fundamental” than free
expression. If, later on, the industry actually
proved a violation of California trade
secrets law, then the court allowed that a
permanent injunction or money damages
would be appropriate.121
     Not only the movie industry but many
other businesses were up in arms after this
ruling. Forty-two companies or organiza-
tions filed briefs supporting the
association’s appeal to the California
Supreme Court. Professor Richard Epstein,
who wrote a brief on behalf of Microsoft,
Ford, and Boeing, among others, claimed
that the appeals court ruling threatened “a
wide range of trade secrets, from customer
lists to blueprints to industrial know-how –
even the secret formula for Coca-Cola.”122
     In August 2003, the California Supreme
Court reversed the appeals court’s expan-
sive First Amendment ruling, but in a way
that promised little consolation to the
industry. A “trade secrets” injunction, even
a preliminary one, is not a prior restraint,
said the court, and does not present First
Amendment problems. But whether the
injunction was really justified in this case
was another matter. How can DeCSS be a
secret of any kind, asked the court, when it
is widely available on the Web? This was
the question for the court of appeals to
decide “on remand.” One judge would not
have bothered with a remand, since he
thought it obvious that DeCSS was not a
“trade secret.”123
SQUELCHING COMPETITION
     The DMCA has also become a weapon
for companies seeking to squelch competi-
tion. In 1999, for example, the Sony
Corporation’s video games division ob-
tained a preliminary injunction stopping the
sale of a product called “Game Enhancer.”
The product allowed users to play games
sold abroad on Sony playstations which are
programmed to recognize only games sold
domestically. Sony’s theory was that the
Enhancer circumvented copyrighted
software in Sony’s playstation. But the
result was to reinforce Sony’s practice of
limiting the use of its products to certain
geographical areas. In addition, the En-
hancer allowed players to modify video
games in a manner similar to Sony’s own
product, the “Game Shark.” The possibility
that Sony’s primary purpose in stopping the
Enhancer was to defeat this competition
got little sympathy from the court.124
     Four years later, Lexmark International,
a manufacturer of computer printers, also
obtained a preliminary injunction, this time
banning the distribution of a microchip that
mimicks the “authentication sequence” in
Lexmark’s toner cartridge. The chip
enables competitors to market remanu-
factured cartridges that work with
Lexmark printers. Lexmark persuaded a
federal judge that the authentication
sequence of its toner cartridge is a form of
encryption that needs to be unlocked in
order to access the copyrighted software in
its computer printer. Under this convoluted
reasoning, the competing microchip
amounted to a circumvention tool banned
by the DMCA.125
     Representative Zoe Lofgren, one of the
relatively few members of Congress who
opposes the broad reach of the DMCA,
cited the Lexmark case as an example of
digital rights management being pushed too
far. “We have ceded too much power to
copyright owners,” Lofgren said. “People
are afraid to proceed on innovative mea-
sures.”126
     Meanwhile, the maker of the competing
microchip petitioned the U.S. Copyright
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Office, already mulling over numerous
requests for fair-use exemptions as part of
its second rulemaking proceeding under
the DMCA, to create an exemption for
computer programs that are embedded in
printers and toner cartridges. In its petition,
the company argued that Lexmark should
not be able to use the DMCA to stifle
competition. In October 2003, the Copy-
right Office rejected the request.127
RESEARCHING INTERNET F ILTERS
     An example of how the DMCA affects
both research and political advocacy was
the ACLU’s ill-fated lawsuit against N2H2,
manufacturer of a popular Internet filter
called “Bess.” Filters are widely but
inaccurately promoted as efficient mecha-
nisms for blocking out pornography and
other controversial online content.128 A
young cyber-expert, Ben Edelman, does
research on the operation of filters, and has
provided the public with information on
their propensity to block thousands of
valuable, educational Web sites.
     To conduct his research, and determine
how accurately Bess blocks online pornog-
raphy, Edelman needed to obtain its list of
blocked sites. This in turn required him to
reverse engineer and unlock the filter’s
copyright-protected program. And although
the Copyright Office has created an
exception to the DMCA for those wanting
to access Internet filter block lists, the
exception doesn’t extend to the tools
necessary to do the job.
     “In other words,” as the ACLU ex-
plained, “even though Ben and everyone
else has a right to perform that act of
circumvention, creating and distributing the
tool necessary for actually exercising that
right is prohibited.”129 Since Edelman’s
purpose was “legitimate research and
criticism rather than piracy,” his planned
project should have qualified as fair use, as
well as First Amendment-protected expres-
sion. Yet because he wanted to distribute
his decryption program so that others could
access Bess’s block list, the ACLU said his
actions would violate the DMCA. It sued
N2H2, hoping to get a judicial declaration
that the DMCA would be unconstitutional if
applied to outlaw Edelman’s research.
     N2H2, defending the suit, argued that
until Edelman had actually de-crypted its
program, there was no live controversy for
the federal courts to resolve – in other
words, that the suit was premature. The
judge agreed, and in April 2003, dismissed
the case. Edelman’s description of his
intended research, the judge said, was too
vague to determine whether it would really
violate the DMCA, and it was equally
speculative whether N2H2 would sue to
stop him.
     But the underlying reason for dismissing
the case may have been the judge’s lack of
sympathy with
Edelman’s
claim. “There is
no plausibly
protected
constitutional
interest that
Edelman can
assert that
outweighs
N2H2’s right to protect its copyrighted
property from an invasive and destructive
trespass,” he wrote.130
     Yet few free-expression issues today
are more sweeping in their implications
than censorship caused by Internet filters
as they block art, information, and ideas
that their corporate manufacturers decide
are inappropriate, or that their keyword-
based programs mistakenly target. As
another activist, Seth Finkelstein, put it,
How can DeCSS
be a secret of any
kind, asked the
court, when it is
widely available
on the Web?
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THE CIRCUMVENTION D ILEMMA
     The court of appeals in the Corley case
put its finger on the circumvention dilemma
when it identified “two unattractive alterna-
tives”: either tolerate some infringement of
intellectual freedom in an effort to stop
piracy, or else “tolerate some decryption”
in order to avoid trampling on free expres-
sion. This “fundamental choice,” said the
court, “cannot be entirely avoided.”132
     With the DMCA, Congress chose to
impair a great deal of intellectual freedom
in an effort to stop circumvention tools that
can be used by digital pirates. And although
there is no perfect answer to the circum-
vention dilemma, it seems clear that the
DMCA strikes too repressive a bargain.
     In May 2002, the Electronic Frontier
Foundation published Unintended Conse-
quences, a report on the costs to intellec-
tual freedom inflicted by the DMCA. In
addition to summarizing the Felten, Sky-
larov, and other cases, the report recounted
how a Dutch cryptographer and security
systems analyst discovered a major secu-
rity flaw in an Intel video encryption
system but declined to publish his findings
“on the grounds that he travels frequently
to the U.S. and is fearful of prosecution”
under the DMCA. Other foreign scientists
are similarly wary of traveling to the U.S.,
and the organizers of at least one major
academic conference have chosen to hold
all future meetings abroad.133
     There is no question that, in the inter-
ests of stopping illegal copying, the DMCA
and related anti-circumvention laws stifle
legitimate research, communication, and
use of creative works. As one columnist
observed, “even the President’s Special
Advisor for Cybersecurity has expressed
concern that the DMCA stifles legitimate
research needed to improve homeland
security.”134 The government’s attempt, in
cases like Felten’s and Sklyarov’s, to
distinguish between encryption research
done for scholarly ends and research done
for purposes of infringement is inherently
unstable, and insufficient to let researchers
or hackers know what is or is not a crime.
     The question is what can be done to
restore the balance. The lawyers for Eric
Corley suggested a number of ways the
DMCA could be revised or narrowed,
while still combating piracy. Congress could
keep the anti-circumvention rules but
create broader exemptions for fair use and
other non-infringing uses, especially in
libraries. It could limit liability “to those who
intentionally aid and abet copyright infringe-
ment or who conspire to infringe copy-
rights,” as is done in laws governing
burglars’ tools. It could amend the law to
allow copying for personal, noncommercial
purposes. And it could make disseminators
of decryption codes liable only if they
“induced or acted in collusion with” copy-
right infringers.135
     Many other measures could be consid-
ered to redress the balance. What should
be kept in mind is that copyright enforce-
ment will never be perfect, nor should it be.
As commentators have noted, a leaky
system is best, for culture and free expres-
sion. The DMCA, in trying to plug every
leak, ends up radically restructuring the
system. Its strict enforcement of the
industry’s efforts to control both illegal and
legal uses of copyrighted material – as well
as uses that are in that dim gray area of
possibly fair use – sacrifices research,
communication, creativity, and simple
enjoyment in the dubious interests of
maximum profit and total control.
“independent investigation of the snake oil
claims” of filtering companies has now
become “fraught with legal peril.”131
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Chapter 4:
File Sharing, Free Exchange, and the
Online Commons
Napster and Its Successors
     Since the late 1990s, “peer-to-peer”
sharing of popular music has been the
copyright industry’s most visible concern,
and the Napster case was its first big
attempt to stop it. As with DeCSS, the
industry decided, at least initially, to go
after the technology that enables file-
sharing rather than users of the technology
who actually engage in copyright infringe-
ment.
     Napster was the brainchild of 19 year-
old Shawn Fanning who, by 2000, had
attracted $15 million in venture capital to
support his “MusicShare” software and a
Web site that offered indexing and techni-
cal help to music lovers wanting to share
their digital “MP3” music files. The files
themselves remained on their owners’
computers, but Napster’s site and software
allowed searches through those computers,
and enabled free transfers. Fanning said he
was merely a matchmaker, helping fans
engage in the kind of sharing and copying
that had always transpired offline. But
there was no question, as one columnist put
it, that Napster was also “part of a move-
ment challenging copyright.”136
     In 2000, the rock band Metallica fired
the first volley in the peer-to-peer wars by
suing Yale, Indiana University, and the
University of Southern California for
allowing students to use Napster to copy
songs. Yale promptly blocked access to
Napster but the others, in the words of one
advocate, rejected the demand and stood
up “for principles of academic freedom
[and] free exchange of information.”137
     Shortly afterwards, A&M Records,
Geffen, Sony, and other music producers
sued Napster itself, claiming it was a
“contributory and vicarious copyright
infringer.” With about 60 million users
sharing nearly 40 million songs, they said,
Napster was a major threat to the integrity
of copyright. The judge agreed, and issued
a preliminary injunction barring Napster,
Inc. from “engaging in, or faciliating others
in copying, downloading, uploading, trans-
mitting, or distributing” copyrighted mu-
sic.138
     Napster had two main defenses. First, it
argued that file-sharing was fair use, not
copyright infringement. After all, in the
Sony case involving VCRs, the Supreme
Court had said that copying an entire work
can sometimes be fair use. Moreover,
many fans used Napster to sample music in
order to decide whether to buy it, much as
shoppers do with earphones and sample
disks in music stores.
     But even assuming that many users
were making unlawful copies, Napster said,
it wasn’t guilty of “contributory” or “vicari-
ous” infringement simply because its
software was being used for illegal pur-
poses. Burglars use tools, but the manufac-
turers of screwdrivers are not liable for
their illegal acts. Hence, Napster’s soft-
ware was no more unlawful than tape
recorders and other tools for copying
music. A 1992 federal law, the Audio Home
Recording Act, protects such tape record-
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ing against claims of copyright infringe-
ment.139
     The courts were not impressed. They
found Napster guilty as charged because it
had “sufficient knowledge” that infringe-
ment was going on, its software contributed
to the
illegal
activity,
and it had
the ability
“to police its system” but failed to do so.
Importantly, though, the court of appeals
did modify the preliminary injunction
against Napster, which it found to be too
broad. It was Napster’s conduct, not
simply its technology, that contributed to
copyright infringement, said the appeals
court. To find Napster guilty of copyright
violations simply because it “allows for
infringing uses would violate Sony and
potentially restrict activity unrelated to
infringing use.”140
     The appeals court thus ordered that the
injunction be narrowed because it was
unfair to put “the entire burden” on
Napster of ensuring that no copyright
infringement was going on through the use
of its system. Instead, the music companies
had to tell Napster which of their copy-
righted works were available on its system
before Napster had the duty to delete
them.
     But even after the trial judge issued this
modified injunction, Napster was doomed.
Within a few months, the judge ordered a
shutdown of the site until Napster removed
all files from its index which it had “reason-
able knowledge” contained copyrighted
works. Even with a new filtering system in
place, Napster wasn’t able to satisfy the
court, and it eventually agreed to a $26
million settlement of the case. Soon after, it
went out of business.141
     Senator Orrin Hatch commented with
dismay on the process by which a prelimi-
nary injunction – “before a trial on the
merits, mind you” – destroyed an enter-
prise “that had developed a community of
over 50 million music fans.”142
     But the demise of Napster hardly ended
online file-sharing. New peer-to-peer
systems like Grokster, Morpheus, and
KaZaA soon replaced Napster. These
programs enable users to connect with
each other and share materials of all kinds,
including music, without a central Web site,
index, or overt conduct of the kind that
incriminated Napster. By 2002, more than
14 million fans were using Grokster and
similar programs to download music,
movies, TV shows, photos, and text for
personal use.143
     Another lawsuit was inevitable, and in
late 2001, 28 media companies sued the
distributors of Grokster, Morpheus, and
KaZaA for contributory copyright infringe-
ment. MusicCity, the developer of
Morpheus, moved to dismiss the case,
arguing that under the Sony decision,
courts cannot ban technology that is
capable of lawful uses simply because it
can also be used for infringement.
MusicCity pointed out, for example, that
Morpheus file-sharing technology is used
by Project Gutenberg, a respected online
archive, to convert many non-copyrighted
works, “from the King James Bible to
Shakespeare to the CIA World Fact Book,”
to digital form.144
     In April 2003, the federal court agreed.
It ruled that Morpheus and Grokster are
closer to VCRs and photocopy machines
than to a centralized file-sharing service
like Napster. Although the distributors of
the programs undoubtedly know that many
users are infringing copyrights, the judge
found no evidence that they assisted with
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specific acts of infringement. And there are
“substantial noninfringing uses” for the file-
sharing software, he found – from distribut-
ing free songs to “sharing the works of
Shakespeare.”145
     As of late 2003, the industry’s appeal of
this decision was pending. But however the
Grokster case is ultimately decided, it is
difficult to imagine that file-sharing technol-
ogy will ever be completely suppressed.
For one thing, online sharing and copying
goes well beyond the borders of the United
States. Although StreamCast, the succes-
sor to MusicCity, is based in Tennessee and
Grokster is owned by a California family,
KaZaA, as of late 2002, was managed in
Australia and distributed by a company
incorporated on the South Pacific island of
Vanuatu. Its computer servers were in
Denmark and as The New York Times
reported, “its software was last seen in
Estonia.”146
     This global aspect means that courts in
different nations will take different ap-
proaches to file-sharing. Early in 2002, for
example, the Amsterdam Court of Justice
in the Netherlands ruled that KaZaA is not
liable for the way individuals use its soft-
ware, and that those concerned with
copyright violations should go after the
infringers, not the makers of tools.147 Even
if a U.S. appeals court – or, eventually, the
Supreme Court – comes out the other way,
its ruling will have limited effect in the face
of the Dutch decision.
     Journalist John Alderman notes the
irony that by killing Napster, the music
industry pushed fans toward more sophisti-
cated programs which replaced the central
online meeting place with software that
directly connects users to each other. He
berates the industry for failing to embrace
the new technology and find attractive
ways to distribute music, movies, and other
arts online. Instead, he says, the industry,
dinosaur-like, tried to stop history.148
      Eventually, music companies did set up
Web sites where songs can be obtained
online for modest fees. But intra-industry
disagreements have hobbled these ven-
tures; some performers have been in-
censed at their minuscule share of the
royalties; and consumers have generally
not been thrilled to find that they are only
allowed to “rent” songs, which disappear
after a set period of time and cannot be
moved to portable MP3 players. In addi-
tion, popular new recordings have been
kept out of the archives in an attempt to
protect CD sales.149
     Although efforts to package and sell
music online continue – including a promis-
ing venture by Apple in 2003 that is less
restrictive than the earlier services – it is
also true, as the industry says, that it is
difficult for sites charging even small fees
to compete with free music. By the middle
of 2003, KaZaA had reportedly been
downloaded more than 270 million times –
more than any other free program on
Download.com.150
Universities, New Lawsuits, and
Corporate Sabotage
     Even before the music industry lost the
Grokster case, it was exploring other ways
to defeat file-sharing. In mid-2003, it sued
four college students who, it claimed, were
operating “little Napsters” at their universi-
ties. The students were using software like
“Flatlan,” “Phynd,” and “Direct Connect”
to index files and handle search requests.
     The lawsuits, which demanded dam-
ages of $150,000 for every work that was
unlawfully copied – for a potential total of
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billions of dollars – were intended to send a
clear message of intimidation, and they had
the desired effect. In little more than a
week, the students and their families settled
the suits, agreeing to pay the RIAA
$12,000-$15,000 each and to shut down the
software programs.151
     But these suits would not necessarily
have been winners for the industry. The
technologies involved, as one expert said,
look “very different than the old Napster
model.” Phynd, for example, “is a generic
search engine technology that lets users
configure it to search whatever they
want.” Flatlan “lets a student set up a
search engine – often on an ordinary dorm
room PC – that scours all computers
connected to a campus network that have
Windows file-sharing turned on.” Unlike
Napster or even KaZaA, “Flatlan searches
a network that already exists.”152
     One commentator noted that substitut-
ing “www.google.com” for “wake.prince-
ton.edu” in one of the industry’s lawsuits
would describe the operation of the popular
search engine very well. “Can you use
Google to find and download copyrighted
materials? You betcha. ... But of course,
Google’s a fairly good-size company with a
legal staff and would probably fight the
RIAA.”153
     The suits against college students
represented a major escalation in the file-
sharing wars. The industry had been trying
for years to persuade universities to
monitor students’ and professors’ computer
use and crack down on copying. On the
one hand, the trade associations said that
“copyright infringement is theft, ... pure and
simple.” On the other hand, there are
legitimate uses of peer-to-peer networks,
particularly in academia. These include the
sharing of scientific research and other
collaborative projects. The Chronicle of
Higher Education suggested that without
a wholesale crackdown, universities could
still stop piracy by observing “unusual
spikes that might indicate that someone
was illegally sharing the latest Ben Affleck
movie or Britney Spears video.”154
     And, as the Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center (EPIC) argued, the collegiate
surveillance desired by the industry would
require universities to “delve into the
content and intended uses of almost every
communication. Such a level of monitoring
is not only impracticable; it is incompatible
with intellectual freedom. ... Network
monitoring for bandwidth management is
appropriate, but monitoring of individuals’
activities does not comport with higher
education values.”155
     In addition to pressuring universities, the
industry fights file-sharing by sending
“take-down” letters to both academic and
non-academic Internet service providers
(ISPs). The letters demand that the ISPs
remove Web sites, search engines, or other
online material that they say contains
copyright-protected work. Under a section
of the DMCA, ISPs can be liable for
copyright infringement by their users unless
they comply “expeditiously” with such
industry notices.156
     Of course, the industry’s claims are not
always correct. Indeed, without a legal
proceeding to test their accuracy, it is
unlikely that they would be.
     For example, in May 2003, the RIAA
publicly apologized to an academic ISP,
Penn State University, for sending a “stiff
copyright warning” that turned out to be
mistaken. The letter alleged that the
university’s astronomy department was
unlawfully distributing songs by the musi-
cian Usher. The department’s system
manager searched in vain for such a file,
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and finally solved the mystery when he
discovered that a professor named Usher
was mentioned on the site, along with a
song “performed by astronomers about the
Swift gamma ray satellite, which Penn
State helped to design.” The combination
of “Usher” and the “.mp3” suffix had,
according to one news report, “triggered
the RIAA’s automatic copyright crawl-
ers.”157
     In another dubious application of the
DMCA’s take-down provisions, the Inter-
net company Verio, under pressure from
Dow Chemical Company, removed the
activist service provider Thing.net from the
Web because of a parody press release
posted on the 18th anniversary of the
Bhopal disaster in India – “a deadpan
statement, which many people took to be
real,” explaining that Dow “could not
accept responsibility for the disaster due to
its primary allegiance to its shareholders
and to the bottom line.” Dow had sent a
stern notice to Verio under the DMCA.
The political commentary was silenced
thanks to the DMCA’s automatic take-
down provisions, overreaching by Dow, and
Verio’s failure to challenge Dow’s claim
that the parody constituted copyright and
trademark infringement. According to
Thing.net, organizations affected by the
take-down included the art space P.S.1,
Artforum magazine, Tenant.net, which aids
renters facing eviction, and hundreds
more.158
     The DMCA does require ISPs to
“notify the subscriber” whose material has
been removed as a result of the notice-and-
take-down rules. If the subscriber submits
a “counter-notification” in the form pre-
scribed by the law, the ISP must then undo
the removal, unless the company that
originally complained goes to court.159 But
there is no time specified for notifying the
subscriber (“promptly” is all the DMCA
says), and many individuals do not have
the legal knowledge or wherewithal to
follow the procedure laid out by the law.
Meanwhile, the mandatory take-down may
last indefinitely. It allows the industry to
short-circuit lengthy and burdensome
lawsuits, but risks suppressing a great deal
of legitimate expression in the process.
     Most ISPs do not welcome take-down
letters. They find the prospect of policing
possible unlawful activity among their
billions of users to be distinctly unappealing
– somewhat like forcing the telephone
company to listen in on users’ conversa-
tions for evidence of crime. But under the
DMCA, they do not have much choice.
     In 2002, one ISP challenged a part of
the DMCA’s notice-and-take-down
scheme. This provision allows copyright
owners to obtain subpoenas from a federal
court requiring ISPs to identify users who,
the copyright owners claim, are engaged in
infringement. There does not need to be
any pending lawsuit for the subpoenas to
be issued. Verizon went to court to contest
an RIAA subpoena.
     Verizon challenged both the constitu-
tionality of the DMCA’s subpoena provi-
sion, and the broad way that the RIAA
was interpreting it – to
apply not just to Web
sites, but to any online
communication, even
if the ISP is not
hosting it, but simply
transmitting it. Verizon
argued that the law
contains no “built-in
protection for expres-
sion” of the type that the Supreme Court
specifically noted in the Eldred case was
an essential element of the copyright
“Can you use
Google to find
and download
copyrighted
materials? You
betcha.”
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system. But a federal judge rejected
Verizon’s arguments, and ordered it to
comply with the subpoena.160 As of late
2003, the case was on appeal.
     Meanwhile, relying on the Verizon
decision, the RIAA now sent nearly 1,000
subpoenas to ISPs, including universities,
demanding the names of users who it
claimed were sharing copyrighted music.
     In response, Senator Norm Coleman
opened a legislative inquiry into whether
the RIAA’s
tactics “are
violating the
privacy rights
of innocent
people.” He
criticized the
RIAA for
issuing subpoe-
nas for “‘un-
suspecting
grandparents
whose grandchildren have used their
personal computers.’” The New York
Times quoted one parent who used KaZaA
“to find songs that included ‘Happy Birth-
day’ to play for his young daughter when
she woke up on her birthday, among other
times. ‘It’s cute, but look what happened,’
he said. ‘It’s an expensive birthday.’”161
     Although a few colleges and one ISP
went to court to fight the subpoenas,162
most complied, supplying the industry with
the identifying information it needed to sue
individual file-sharers. In early September,
the RIAA filed 261 such suits – one of
them against a 12 year-old girl – while
simultaneously offering an “amnesty” to
anyone who would delete all shared files
and submit a statement swearing to resist
all future file-sharing temptations.
     Some observers questioned the wisdom
of the industry’s hard-nosed strategy. As
Professor Jane Ginsburg said:
     Mass lawsuits against music fans are
the most visible and controversial of music
companies’ strategies, but quieter initiatives
are also underway. The industry continues
to develop new DRM techniques – for
example, Epic Records’ attempt in 2002 to
lock up advance copies of Tori Amos and
Pearl Jam CDs by gluing them inside Sony
Walkman players that are then sent to
reviewers. One observer commented on
this tactic: “even a ‘glueman’ player is
unlikely to deter a diehard critic” who
wants to copy or resell the disk. A reviewer
said he was able to pop the player open, in
order to “listen to it how I want to listen to
it – and in my stereo is where it sounds
best.”164 For the music industry to force
reviewers less resourceful than this one to
evaluate new music by listening to it on a
Walkman instead of a home stereo does
seem self-defeating.
     Another plan, contemplated by the Walt
Disney Company in July 2003, involves
manufacturing DVDs that automatically
stop working after a certain time. The idea,
ostensibly, is to save consumers the trouble
of returning DVD rentals to their local
video store. One environmentalist noted
that the impact of disposable movies could
be horrendous, “as millions of now useless
discs clog the landfills with nonbiode-
gradable polymers.” Still other schemes
EPIC Records
locked up
advance copies of
Tori Amos and
Pearl Jam CDs by
gluing them
inside Sony
Walkman players.
It could backfire. If you have really
widespread copyright infringement,
there is a great temptation to say if
it’s that widespread it can’t be
infringing any more. The risk of
suing individuals is that there will be
more pressure in that direction.163
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floated in 2003 include lowering the retail
prices of CDs, and urging legislation to
outlaw file-sharing on the theory that it
enables minors to access pornography.165
     Finally, the industry has embarked on
“direct action.” In 2002, journalists reported
on a “cottage industry” of saboteurs,
supported by media companies, who
“saturate file-swapping networks with false
or corrupted versions of songs and videos,
hoping to frustrate would-be download-
ers.”166 The next year, the industry took its
campaign one step further, by “quietly
financing the development and testing of
software programs that would sabotage the
computers and Internet connections of
people who download pirated music.” The
proposed sabotage could take three forms:
redirecting users to Web sites where they
can buy songs; scanning personal comput-
ers for music files that might be illegally
copied and then deleting them; or freezing
a person’s computer system entirely. The
second option, one executive admitted, was
problematic because “it was deleting
legitimate music files, too.”167
Solutions: Restoring the Copy-
right/Free Expression Balance
     Many critics argue that online file-
sharing, whether or not every instance of it
violates copyright law, actually helps rather
than harms the music industry. Negativ-
land, a group of activist musicians, says
that “the literally unconsumable plethora”
of free music online “does create sales.”
Free music is “excellent advertising,”
which produces enough new sales to
balance out losses caused by file-sharing.
“The amount of free music downloading
going on (perhaps now in the billions)
really scares the recording industry, but
they seem to forget the scales of practical-
ity involved. They only need to sell a
fraction of that amount to become sinfully
rich anyway.”168
     Similarly, John Alderman points out that
through file-sharing, “songs and artists
were rediscovered by listeners whose fond
memories wouldn’t support a $16 CD but
who were happy to download a song for a
nostalgic listen.”169 In this scenario, no sale
is lost because none was likely in the first
place. To the contrary, the triggering of
fond memories might lead to a purchase
that would not otherwise happen.
     Surveys late in 2002 indicated that
although music sales were down about
10% for the year, it was not clear that file-
sharing – rather than a slow economy or
other factors – was responsible. According
to one report, 32% of Internet downloaders
said they bought less music since they
began file-sharing online, but 25% said they
bought more. Another survey found that
people who use file-sharing have increased
their overall spending on tapes and CDs:
“47% of experienced file sharers with
broadband Internet access and CD burners
increased their spending, while 36%
decreased their spending.” A report late in
2002 suggested that old-fashioned bootleg-
ging, rather than online file-sharing, was a
more likely factor in the decline of music
sales.170
     As for the potential loss to musicians
from file-sharing, some commentators
suggest exploring alternative payment
options. Back in the 1960s, the Grateful
Dead promoted free circulation of bootleg
tapes, believing that more sales of concert
tickets would result.171 More recently,
Pearl Jam left Sony’s Epic label and “is
now a prominent member of the indepen-
dent music scene, with no other means of
distribution” than the Internet. And
Metallica, once a vocal opponent of online
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file-sharing, by 2003 had released some
songs for free online.172
     But the industry has continued to push
Congress for stronger copyright protection
and stricter enforcement. In late 2001,
Senator Fritz Hollings introduced a bill that
would have required “security technolo-
gies” in all new digital products – including
CDs, videos, e-books, printers, hard drives,
CD and DVD players, video game con-
soles, set-top cable boxes, and satellite TV.
Anyone removing or altering the locks, or
distributing copyrighted material with the
locks disabled, would face the usual
copyright penalties of five years in prison
and fines up to $500,000 for a first offense;
double that for subsequent offenses.173
     Even more than the DMCA, Hollings’s
bill would have eliminated the balancing
role traditionally performed by courts in
copyright cases, by giving the force of law
to private security systems and punishing
those who evade or disable them, regard-
less of the impact on fair use or intellectual
freedom. The basic problem with this
approach is that DRM technologies cannot
possibly take account of the variations and
subtleties of copyright law, and particularly
fair use.
     As copyright expert Deirdre Mulligan
explains, “only those policies that can be
reliably reduced to yes/no decisions can be
automated successfully. ... Policies that are
subject to many exemptions or based on
conditions that may be indeterminate or
external are difficult or impossible to
automate with DRM.”174
     Hollings’s proposal was not greeted
happily by cyber-activists or, more signifi-
cant politically, by manufacturers. While
groups such as StopPoliceware.org and
Boycott-riaa.com argued that Hollings’s
mandatory “policeware” would hopelessly
atrophy fair use and first-sale rights already
compromised by the DMCA,175 software
manufacturers struck a deal with the music
industry. The manufacturers agreed not to
support legislation such as that championed
by Representative Rick Boucher, that
would “clarify and bolster the right of
people to use copyrighted material in the
digital age,” while in return the recording
companies backed off from Hollings’s
proposal.176
     But legislative support for the industry
continues. By mid-2003 seven states had
passed “super DMCAs” that are even
broader than the original, federal version.
The year before, Representative Howard
Berman proposed a “Peer to Peer Piracy
Prevention Act” to create “a safe harbor
from liability” for media companies engag-
ing in “reasonable, limited self-help mea-
sures to thwart P2P piracy” – that is,
sabotaging personal computers and soft-
ware if they believe their owners are
violating copyright law.177
     Whatever the outcome of all the
lawsuits, lobbying, and proposed new laws,
it is clear that, thanks to the Internet, our
culture has fundamentally changed. As
hard as the industry pushes to control how
its products are used, new ways of copying
and sharing emerge. “In the long run,” as
one scholar says, “the media industry may
well exhaust itself in a Quixotic quest to
keep the ever growing and ever more
sophisticated digital genie bottled up.”178
     Especially in the age of the Internet,
with its potential for massive sharing and
copying, more balanced approaches are
possible. The lawyers representing Eric
Corley gave some examples. (See “The
Circumvention Dilemma,” in chapter III.)
Attorney David Nimmer suggests others:
Congress could require companies that
encrypt copyrighted works to provide a
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means of unlocking them for legitimate
first-sale or fair-use purposes. It could also
protect consumers from legal liability if
they find themselves “stymied by over-
reaching on the part of content owners,”
and resort to “self-help.”179
     Some of Nimmer’s ideas have been
adopted by Representatives Rick Boucher
and Zoe Lofgren, two of a growing contin-
gent in Congress who recognize that the
imbalance in current copyright law is
unhealthy and are working to change it. In
2002, Boucher and two colleagues filed
legislation that would have ameliorated
some of the more drastic terms of the
DMCA. Their bill would have exempted
from the law anyone who “is acting solely
in furtherance of scientific research into
technological protection measures,” as well
as any circumvention for purposes of fair
use. Following the Sony case, it would also
have legalized the manufacture or distribu-
tion of “a hardware or software product
capable of enabling significant non-infring-
ing use of the copyrighted work.”180
     Another bill, filed by Representative
Lofgren, stated that it would “restore the
traditional balance between copyright
holders and society” by allowing circum-
vention for fair use purposes – unless the
copyright owner makes tools available to
do this without additional cost. Lofgren’s
bill would also have allowed the manufac-
ture and distribution of circumvention tools
that are “necessary to enable a non-
infringing use.”181
     Although neither bill passed in 2002,
legislative efforts are continuing. Boucher
reintroduced his “Digital Media Consum-
ers’ Rights Act” in 2003, with support from
Intel, Verizon, Sun Microsystems, the
American Library Association, the Ameri-
can Association of Universities, the Na-
tional Humanities Alliance, and several
other corporations and public interest
groups.182
     As Boucher has written, clickwrap
licenses and other forms of digital rights
management, backed up with enforcement
tools like the DMCA, are endangering free
expression. From “the college student who
photocopies a page from a library book or
prints an article from a newspaper’s Web
site for use in writing a report, to the
newspaper reporter excerpting materials
from a document for a
story,” Boucher said, “the
very vibrancy of our democ-
racy is dependent upon the
information availability and
use facilitated by the fair-use
doctrine.” And if the direc-
tion of U.S. copyright policy
doesn’t change, he warned,
“a time may soon come
when what is available for
free on library shelves will only be available
on a ‘pay per use’ basis.”183
     Lawrence Lessig adds that mandatory
licensing of music online – that is, requiring
copyright owners to allow the replay or
copying of their products in exchange for a
reasonable fee – would provide the indus-
try with compensation while stopping its
attempts to shut down the Groksters of the
world.184 Mandatory licensing is a standard
feature of music on radio.
     Legislation was also filed in 2003 to
address the wreckage left by the Supreme
Court’s Eldred v. Ashcroft decision.
Adopting Lessig’s proposal that copyright
owners be required to renew after a
certain time, so that works without com-
mercial value can enter the public domain
sooner, Representative Lofgren introduced
the “Public Domain Enhancement Act” of
2003. It would require copyright holders to
pay a $1 renewal fee after 50 years, and
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again every ten years, until the end of the
copyright term.185
     Non-legislative efforts to relax some of
the more oppressive features of the current
system are also gaining momentum. The
open source movement, for example,
works to make source code (the human-
readable building blocks of software)
available to all who use computer pro-
grams. The open source Linux operating
system has become an increasingly popular
alternative to Microsoft.
     Microsoft and other manufacturers are
aware of the challenge posed by Linux. In
May 2002, they formed the “Initiative for
Software Choice” to combat the increasing
number of legislative proposals and state-
ments from foreign governments promoting
open source software. The industry group
said it simply wanted “even-handed compe-
tition,” but Bruce Perens, a strategist who
was fired by Hewlett-Packard because of
his open source advocacy, said the group’s
real purpose was to quash competition
from Linux. Perens formed his own
organization, “Sincere Choice,” to advocate
for governments to buy software “that
operates well with other programs.” The
issue is crucial, he says, because software
giants like Microsoft “have huge toll booths
on the Internet that can limit the spread of
open source software.”186
     Promoters of open source software
have also questioned the generosity of
Microsoft’s gifts to nonprofits, which may
amount to $1 billion annually. Making
schools and other potentially big buyers of
computer technology dependent on
Microsoft through gifts obviously inhibits
their ability to choose open source alterna-
tives down the road.187
     In October 2002, Mitch Kapor, a
longtime open source supporter who made
his fortune with the Lotus spreadsheet,
formed the “Open Source Applications
Foundation” to create and distribute free
software for e-mail programs, file-sharing,
and other collaborations. The foundation
offers its software for free to individuals or
organizations, provided they reciprocate by
making programs they produce with the
foundation’s software freely available as
well.188
     Earlier in 2002, Lessig and his col-
leagues began another organization, Cre-
ative Commons, with the goal of enlarging
the public domain. Their first project was to
design licensing agreements that would
allow works to be copied and used well
before their copyright term expires. Musi-
cians interested in building an audience and
visual artists wanting to disseminate their
work can license it for noncommercial
copying. “Inspired in part by the free-
software movement,” they explained,
“which has attracted thousands of computer
programmers to contribute their work to the
public domain, Creative Commons plans to
create a ‘conservancy’ for donations of
valuable intellectual property whose owners
might opt for a tax break rather than selling
it into private hands.”189
     A similar project, developed by the Soros
Foundation, aims to counter the increasing
commercialization of academic publishing,
with its often prohibitive subscription fees,
by encouraging scholars and universities to
create open-access journals and “self-
archiving” programs. The goal is to make
research and education more accessible,
“share the learning of the rich with the poor
and the poor with the rich,” and “lay the
foundation for uniting humanity in a com-
mon intellectual conversation and quest for
knowledge.”190
     Yet another recently formed organiza-
tion, Public Knowledge, states as its
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purpose to make intellectual property law
“serve democracy, science, and culture.” It
combines research with activism, working
with librarians, computer scientists, and
others to challenge parts of the DMCA. It
also advocates with the U.S. Patent Office
for policies that will advance scientific
research and public health.191
     The Electronic Frontier Foundation has
also been a leader in promoting alternatives
to a heavily controlled copyright system. In
addition to providing exhaustive information
on copyright battles, EFF’s Web site gives
advice on the uses and limits of file-sharing
and circumvention technology.192
     EFF also collaborates with Harvard’s
Berkman Center and law clinics at other
universities on the Chilling Effects Clear-
inghouse. The brainchild of Berkman
Center fellow Wendy Seltzer, the Clearing-
house offers information on fair use for
Internet sites catering to music or movie
fans or otherwise containing copyrighted or
trademark-protected images. Many of the
sites criticize, parody, or protest the con-
duct of corporate trademark owners. The
database maintains an archive of “cease-
and-desist” letters that corporate copyright
owners frequently use in efforts to shut
down offending Web sites – for example, a
letter accusing the anti-corporate sites
“EnronownstheGOP.org” and “Radioslack.
com” of intellectual property infringe-
ment.193
     Seltzer says the Clearinghouse aims to
“protect free expression against unwar-
ranted legal threats by collecting and
analyzing cease-and-desist notices sent to
Internet users,” and helping them under-
stand their rights in response.194
“Notmickey,” by Ashley Holt
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Conclusion
     Copyright enforcement will never be
perfect, nor should it be. Whether or not
circumventing digital locks or copying
songs, pictures, or articles for friends and
colleagues are technical violations of
copyright law, much of this activity has
been “below the radar” in the past, and
has not prevented publishers, music
producers, or other media companies from
enjoying healthy profits. The legitimate
goal of stopping commercial piracy should
not be an excuse for turning the Internet
and popular culture into highly restricted
and heavily controlled corporate domains
or making criminals of computer scientists
and music-loving teenagers.
     In 1918, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote
that “the noblest of human productions –
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas – become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to
common use.” These “incorporeal produc-
tions,” he said, should have “the attribute of
property” only “in certain classes of cases
where public policy has seemed to demand
it.”195
     Today, public policy has stretched “the
attribute of property” too far, and as a
result has skewed the “difficult balance” of
copyright law. Increasingly, readers,
writers, artists, librarians, scholars, and
many other citizens are recognizing what is
at stake.
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Recommendations
q Move toward restoring the “limited time”/public domain balance by
returning to the copyright terms of the 1976 Act: life plus 50 years for
individuals; 75 years for corporations. Alternatively, require that heirs
and corporations file notices of renewal, thereby allowing works that no
longer have commercial value to enter the public domain sooner.
Require corporate copyright holders to file a notice of renewal after 50
years, and every ten years thereafter, as proposed by Representative
Lofgren.
q Repeal the “tools” provisions of the DMCA, or at least, exempt
anyone whose purpose is political commentary or scientific research.
Legalize the manufacture or distribution of circumvention tools that
permit “significant non-infringing use” of copyrighted works.
q Create broader exemptions for fair use under the DMCA. Limit
liability for circumvention to those who intentionally aid copyright
infringement. Alternatively, interpret the law narrowly to bar only
conventional circumvention devices such as “black boxes,” and not to
censor computer code.196
q Recognize that much copying done for personal, noncommercial
purposes is fair use.
q Require copyright owners to license music and other creative work
online on reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms.
q Eliminate the DMCA requirement that Internet service providers and
search engines remove disputed content from their servers based simply
on a demand letter from a copyright owner. Eliminate ISP liability for
copyright infringement by their users unless they intentionally assist with
infringement.197
q Outlaw the industry practice of encrypting portions of works that are
not copyright-protected – for example, the original text of public domain
works.198
q Encourage alternatives to lengthy copyright terms through Creative
Commons and similar projects.
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